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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few decades, women have left their jobs at home to
seek market employment. Because of this mass movement, the com-
position of the United States labor force has changed considerably. I
Today, 66.3% of all married mothers participate in the workforce.2
As the structure of the labor market shifts from the traditional model
of the male workforce, society must deal with changing family struc-
tures.3 One of the most pressing concerns that has arisen, especially
for working women, is the need to balance child-care responsibilities
and work.4
1. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS-
DERIVED FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, 1948-1987 (Aug. 1988) [hereinafter
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS]; Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S.
Dep't of Labor, Unpublished Data (Mar. 1990) [hereinafter Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Unpublished Data].
2. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Unpublished Data, supra note 1.
3. Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: Restructuring the Workplace, 32 ARIZ. L. REV.
431, 439 (1990).
4. Many commentators have examined the social, political, and moral implications of the
change in the composition of the working population and its impact on the family. Id.; Steven
Mintz & Susan Kellogg, Recent Trends in American Family History.- A Commentary
Describing Dimensions of Demographic and Cultural Change, 21 Hous. L. REV. 789 (1984);
Nellie Pappas, Book Review, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1154 (1988) (reviewing MARIAN W.
EDELMAN, FAMILIES IN PERIL (1987)). An examination of the legal responses to these issues
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Unemployment compensation laws in this country offer a rich
ground to examine varying legal responses to the labor force's press-
ing need for child care. It is within the context of individual state
eligibility requirements that problems relating to this issue arise. All
state statutes provide that a worker may not voluntarily leave her job
or be unavailable for suitable work except for "good cause."' There-
fore, the inquiry is whether child-care responsibilities are included in
the definition of "good cause" under state unemployment compensa-
tion provisions. 6 A worker's eligibility for unemployment compensa-
tion turns upon the definition of "good cause." Today, a majority of
jurisdictions in the United States exclude child care from the "good
cause" provisions of their statutes.7 The impact of this exclusion on
working families is dramatic. It discriminates against working
women by imposing inconsistent demands upon them: they must
enter the workforce to meet the current economic need for dual
incomes,8 yet they are ineligible for unemployment compensation
is even more important, however, because in part, it is through law that society changes its
behavior and reconstructs its traditional images of our social relations. A poignant example of
the effect law can have on society can be found in the court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, 348 U.S. 886 (1954). Prior to Brown, equal protection doctrine was
decontextualized and formal, as exemplified by decisions such as Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896), which reaffirmed the doctrine of "separate but equal". The law operated on
abstract principles with no view to the real substance of the crisis. It was not until Brown that
the Warren court approached the problem from a contextual standpoint. The court used
empirical data to support its change in doctrine and examined the reality of discrimination and
its lasting detrimental impact on black children in making a paradigmatic shift from separate
but equal to desegregation. In retrospect, the changes made by the Warren court were critical.
One wonders what the state of racial affairs would be today without Brown. Similarly, we are
heading to that critical point in the law of unemployment compensation where the denial of
benefits is harming children and, in part, is causing the breakdown of the institution of the
family. Thus, the time is here for another contextual inquiry by the law.
5. Arthur M. Menard, Refusal of Suitable Work, 55 YALE L.J. 134, 135 (1945). A
definition of good cause becomes determinative twice in these statutes. First, it factors into
determinations made as to why a claimant initially left a job, and second, it determines
whether a claimant rightly refused suitable work. Most states' unemployment compensation
laws preclude an employee from leaving a job for any reasons besides those attributable to the
employer. This excludes all personal reasons from the statutory ambit of "good cause" for
voluntarily leaving a job. For example, in 1963, the Florida legislature amended the
unemployment compensation statute by adding the words "attributable to the employer,"
which had not previously appeared in the statute. This drastically affected court decisions in
this area because such an addition effectively excluded all previously allowed personal reasons
for leaving employment from the definition of good cause. Thus, the wording of these good
cause provisions clearly determines the benefits received under the statutes.
6. Kenneth M. Casebeer, Teaching An Old Dog Old Tricks: Coppage v. Kansas and At-
Will Employment Revisited, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 765, 790 n.83 (1985).
7. Id. at 765, 792 n.87.
8. Dowd, supra note 3, at 473-74; BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS (Jan. 1990) (citing statistics which show that of 34.1
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when they-must leave their jobs to care for their children. 9
This double discrimination against working mothers stems in
part from the differing sets of assumptions on which the law and a
market society operate. The law assumes that choices about whether
to work are voluntary and individualistic, whereas the current market
requires dual-income families. This fundamental difference is argua-
bly why the majority of decisions in unemployment compensation law
neither reflect an awareness of, nor respond to, current market reali-
ties. The intersection of unemployment compensation law and child
care illustrates the clash that occurs when the law does not reflect and
reinforce the market. The collateral issue of child care not only exem-
plifies the discord between the law and the market, but also demon-
strates a discord within the market itself. To a certain degree, market
forces acting without consideration of subsequent effects create the
problem of child care. That is, the unstated but nevertheless underly-
ing goal of our market economy is to have both parents working,
thereby increasing aggregate production. Capital managers achieve
this goal by pushing wages down to a minimum such that two
incomes become imperative. The effect of this is to draw more women
into the labor force than in previous years.I' As a result of this mar-
ket trend, however, even a dual income is often still too low and does
not provide for child care, which has become increasingly necessary
as women leave the home to work.' 2
The unemployment compensation doctrine disregards the signifi-
cance of current child-care issues. There is a danger to legal doctrine
of this kind, first because the motivation behind such doctrine and its
resulting power affect actions within the market and within society in
general. The decisions in this area reinforce the status quo, partly
million two-person families in the United States in 1989, 57.1% are families where both the
husband and wife work outside the home).
9. The focus of this Comment is the effects of the current unemployment compensation
system on working mothers. Consequently, most of the language and the statistics used are
directed towards women, with little mention of men. However, the author is aware that this
crisis also affects working fathers and all family members. The absence of any explicit mention
of men is in no way meant to demean men's role in child care.
10. See Casebeer, supra note 6, at 793-97 (outlining general assumptions of labor law
leading to labor cost minimization).
11. ALICE K. HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE
UNITED STATES 300-19 (1982).
12. The market phenomenon of forcing dual incomes causes serious problems for single
mothers. Their wages have been pushed down to a minimum on an assumption that there is
another income in the family. Without a second income, however, single working mothers are
those most drastically affected. The pressure on them to secure adequate, affordable child care
is even greater than on two-income families, which can often themselves not afford child care.
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because of a notion that the status quo is efficient.1 3 Second, the deci-
sions reflect ideological beliefs about the necessity for mobile capital
and managerial prerogatives held by a majority of courts. Such beliefs
also act as the foundation on which industry in this country operates.
Moreover, notions of competitive advantage and high profit margins
make employers reluctant to be innovative in solving child-care
problems; employers do not want to lose their profit margins by initi-
ating progressive child-care programs first and thus compromising
their competitive advantage.
Changes in the law will likely result in changes in the market
with respect to what employers are willing to do in the area of child
care.' 4 If the law sanctioned innovative programs such as on-site
child-care facilities, rather than sanctioning managerial prerogative
and high profit margins, more employers would implement child-care
programs. A doctrine driven by laissez-faire beliefs and misplaced
assumptions about the status quo is unlikely to place the correct value
on issues such as child care.
With an eye towards the indifference in our nation's unemploy-
ment compensation system to the issue of child care, this Comment
examines judicial interpretations of several state unemployment com-
pensation statutes. It identifies doctrinal weaknesses and suggests pol-
icy changes to relieve the current prejudicial effects these laws have on
working parents--especially mothers-and their children. Part II
reviews the history of the labor force, the family, and the treatment of
women in the courts. Part II also documents the entry of large num-
bers of women into the workforce, the effect of this dynamic on the
traditional family structure, and some current concerns about child
care. Part III examines how current unemployment compensation
legislation and its judicial interpretation affect working women's abil-
ity to care and provide for their children. Part III also discusses the
public/private dichotomy that enters the analysis when deciding who
should be financially responsible for the costs of solving the current
child-care problem. Part IV investigates our current images of
13. Courts mistakenly assume that child-care issues create so many economic obstacles
that any systemic inroads would be inefficient. Courts fail to realize that employers can
alleviate the problem by increasing consumer prices. Larger employers may internalize and
spread costs across a broad base. As more women enter the work force, the child-care problem
gets worse, and women cannot, themselves, efficiently internalize the cost of child care. The
inefficiency to women manifests itself in working mothers' decreased production and continual
absence from work. Thus, judicial assumptions that employers cannot overcome economic
obstacles or that the status quo is efficient are mistaken.
14. Changes in law need not come exclusively from the courts. Legislatures could achieve




women and the labor force, focusing on the gendered nature of law.
Part IV attempts to link legal change with market change in light of
our current societal structure regarding families. Part V discusses
policy considerations that courts have largely ignored and suggests
possible solutions to the current problems facing the courts with
regard to unemployment compensation doctrine and child care. Part
VI concludes that an awareness of the problem of child care in our
legal discourse may foster such an awareness in our market economy,
resulting in adjustments to better accommodate working families.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON LABOR FORCE, FAMILIES AND
WOMEN IN THE COURTS: RECENT CHANGES WITH
WOMEN WORKERS AND FAMILY
A full understanding of the current legal response to the issue of
child care is not possible without first examining the history of our
labor force, our notions of family, and the legal treatment of women.
Many perceptions of labor and family stem from traditional ideas dat-
ing back to the seventeenth century when the family was a self-sus-
taining economic unit with the male as the laborer and the female as
the homemaker and nurturer of the children.15 This family structure
remained in place until the nineteenth century when America began
its change from an agrarian to an industrialized nation. Change
brought adjustments in our social structures. Families moved to
urban areas, men got jobs in factories, and women stayed at home to
care for children and guard the private refuge which the home and
family had become.16 Throughout these years and through the mid-
twentieth century, males dominated the labor force. 7
It was not until the early twentieth century and into the Depres-
sion era that women began to leave the home in large numbers to earn
money to help the family survive.18 Because of years of male domina-
tion in the workplace, lawmakers and employers considered only male
needs when constructing rules affecting the workplace. 19 Not surpris-
ingly, these rules often discriminated against women who tried to
enter such workplaces2" and perpetuated perceptions that only males
belonged in the labor force. However, the mass entry of women into
the labor force in the mid-twentieth century challenged these male-
oriented norms.
15. Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1135, 1140.
16. Id. at 1141-42.
17. Id. at 1142.
18. Dowd, supra note 3, at 436.
19. Id. at 435.
20. Id.; Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
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The struggle of women to gain recognition in the workplace is
mirrored by their related struggle in our legal system. The law's indif-
ferent treatment of women is well documented.2" In the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, women had little independence and almost
no recognition as individuals in the courts.22 Most of the laws-
founded on the perceived inferiority and delicacy of women-tied the
woman to her father or spouse.23 Justice Bradley, sitting on the
Supreme Court in 1872, captured the prevailing sentiment about
women in his concurring opinion in Bradwell v. State:
The natural and proper timidity which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The
constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the
divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and
functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say the identity, of
interests and views which belong or should belong to the family
institution, is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct
and independent career from that of her husband .... The para-
mount destiny and mission of women are to fulfill the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.24
It was not until the turn of the century that women, led by Susan
B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton and their supporters, gained
any significant legal rights. The Nineteenth Amendment, which gave
women the right to vote,25 was the first formal step in a long battle in
the legislatures and courts to overcome such chauvanistic ideas about
women as those stated by Justice Bradley. Over the years, the legal
system has responded to the changing roles of women in society; we
have seen the passage of such Acts as the Equal Pay Act,26 the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act,27 and Title VII.28 Courts have recognized
21. Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n of Mo., 479 U.S. 511 (1987);
Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 130. See generally Barbara Flagg & Ruth B. Ginsberg, Some Reflections
on the Feminist Legal Thought of the 1970s, 1989 U. Cmi. LEGAL F. 9 (describing the history
of women in the courts).
22. Teitelbaum, supra note 15, at 1140, 1154 (discussing married women's inability to
separate property and the presumption for paternal custody of children upon separation
throughout the early to mid-1800's).
23. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES KRIER, PROPERTY 325 (2d ed. 1988).
24. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
26. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(1988)).
27. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988)).




women's fundamental rights in decisions such as Roe v. Wade2 9 and
Reed v. Reed.3 ° To a certain degree, then, the legal system has
responded to societal changes from the seventeenth century to the
present in areas of labor," family,3 2 and women. 3 Yet, the legal sys-
tem has failed to respond to the problems created when labor, family
and women converge. Legislators and courts must address the
problems created by this combination and the challenge it presents to
our historical, social, and legal frameworks. The special needs of
women and underlying policy considerations must be factored into
this analysis. In particular, the legal system has failed to respond ade-
quately to child-care needs of working women.
Unemployment compensation law illustrates the courts' failure
to accommodate the inevitable union of women, labor, and family.
Participation of mothers in the labor force with children under eight-
een has risen 24% since 1970.34 Approximately 53.2% of children
under age six have working mothers.35 As a result, most children no
longer come home from school to their mothers, or have mothers as
their primary caretaker.36 Society has shifted child care from the
home to day-care and other child-care centers which attempt to
replace the presence of the mother in the home. 37 This shift has con-
tributed to the erosion of traditional family structures.3' Because
women are a large and necessary part of our work force, 9 and
because women are also a necessary part of the family structure, the
question of child-care rights must be confronted.'
29. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
30. 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (recognizing that sex classifications may violate the Equal
Protection Clause).
31. See supra notes 26-28.
32. Teitelbaum, supra note 15, at 1154 (discussing courts' intervention into child custody
and family-rights matters).
33. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 23, at 325 (discussing legal advances with
respect to married women's property and family rights).
34. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS, supra note 1.
35. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Unpublished Data, supra note 1.
36. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS-HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC STUDIES: WHO'S MINDING THE KIDS? CHILD CARE
ARRANGEMENTS, WINTER 1986-87, SERIES P-70, No. 20, at 3 (1990).
37. Id. at 2. A shift in mother's duties of housework and general family responsibility has
not accompanied the shift from mother as primary caretaker to mother as full-time worker
with children in day care. Somehow, working mothers have taken on new careers without the
luxury of relinquishing their home responsibilities.
38. Dowd, supra note 3, at 437.
39. NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASSOCIATION, CENTER FOR POLICY RESEARCH, TAKING
CARE: STATE DEVELOPMENTS IN CHILD CARE 2 (1990) (projecting that by the year 2000,
75% of all two-person families will have both parents working).
40. This Comment is not advocating a return to the traditional family model. However,
there are certain values that are associated with traditional norms, most notably, structure and
1992]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Many working women today experience conflict between their
desire to advance their careers and their desire to start or care for a
family. Although some employers have implemented progressive
maternity and child-care programs, 41 for the vast majority of women
today, such options are either unavailable, insufficient, or too costly.
42
The insufficiency or nonavailability of programs that aid working
mothers43 exascerbates the conflict for women who both want or need
to work and have children. In light of the current problems associ-
ated with child care, the importance of unemployment compensation
benefits for families faced with these concerns is evident.
III. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
Our unemployment compensation system began in 1935 with the
passage of the Social Security Act, which established a dual system of
federal and state unemployment compensation laws." Initially, the
system was created as a response to the great number of workers,
male and female, who were unemployed due to the depression of the
1930s. It was also a response to the many workers who had entered
the workforce during the early years of World War II because of a
need for increased production, but who would face unemployment at
the end of the war.45
Unemployment compensation is a system of cash payments to
temporarily unemployed workers who have previously worked in the
labor market. 46  Eligibility provisions vary from state to state but
most states require the employee to have worked minimum number of
weeks before becoming eligible for benefits. 47 A tax on employers,
kept separate from a state's general budget, funds the current
system.48
nurturing for children, which should not be lost in the wake of women entering the workforce.
In order to continue our current system of both men and women in the workplace and yet not
sacrifice traditional values, the issue of adequate affordable child care must be addressed so
that there is a viable alternative to the traditional family for parents who work.
41. Id. at 22-23 (mentioning Cumberland Hardwoods in Tennessee as an example of a
successful employer on-cite child-care program to accommodate an after-hours employee
training program and explaining some current parental leave policies).
42. Id. at 14.
43. Id.; Bureau of Labor Statistics, Unpublished Data, supra note 1.
44. Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 636 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1109 (1988)). See generally Eveline M. Burns, Unemployment Compensation and
Socio-Economic Objectives, 55 YALE L.J. 1, 7-8 (1945) (describing the historical underpinnings
of unemployment compensation).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2.
47. Id. at 3; Lee G. Williams, Eligibility for Benefits, 8 VAND. L. REV. 286 (1955).
48. Bums, supra note 44, at 4. The United States system of unemployment compensation
[Vol. 46:751
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The goal of the unemployment compensation system has been a
debated topic.4 9 Some viewed the system as a restrictive, employer-
based one while others see it as a liberal, expansive, worker-based sys-
tem.50 The restrictive theory held that the major purpose of the sys-
tem was the stabilization of the economy5 and the liberal theory saw
the payment of benefits to unemployed workers as the primary goal.52
The two theories had different focuses, the former on employer pre-
rogatives and the latter on the general welfare of the worker. How-
ever, theorists from both camps agreed on the need for a system to
provide economic relief for workers unemployed through no fault of
their own." The policy behind the system announced by President
Roosevelt in 1935 was a rough combination of these two ideas.54
After 1935, there was a move toward emphasizing the benefits aspect
of the system, yet even then, there existed two views on the precise
role the system should play in securing income for the unemployed. 55
One view dictated that only a select group of workers should receive
payments based on past earnings, and even then, only for a very lim-
ited duration.56 The second view advocated massive income protec-
tion for all unemployed workers for a specified period of time.5'
Eveline Burns, commenting on the socio-economic objectives of
the unemployment compensation system, suggests three reasons why
the former, more restrictive view has slowly eroded and why we are
now left with a rather expansive income security program. 58 She con-
tends that implementing the former theory would require strict, uni-
form eligibility requirements which provide a sufficient payment of
income for unemployed workers.59 Second, a restrictive view would
need a "socially acceptable justification for the favored treatment of
those accepted to the unemployment compensation program. '
varies greatly from other countries, most notably Canada, which has a tripartite system of
funding provided by the employer, the worker, and a contribution by the Canadian
government from general revenues. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 44
(1989). For a discussion of the Canadian system, see infra notes 325-26 and accompanying
text.
49. Burns, supra note 44, at 7.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 8.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 8-9.




58. Id. at 8-9.
59. Id. at 9.
60. Id.
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Lastly, such a system would require other means of assistance pro-
vided by the government for those excluded from the program.6'
Burns believes that the flaws in each of these three prerequisites have
caused the breakdown of the restrictive viewpoint.62 First, she
explains, overly strict eligibility requirements would make the system
too difficult to administer and would jeopardize the popularity of the
entire system.63 Second, without any worker contribution in the
United States system, it would be difficult to justify favored treatment
of certain workers.' Finally, the increasing need to provide alterna-
tive means of assistance, coupled with the small likelihood that alter-
native means are forthcoming, cause such a restrictive view to be
unattractive. 65 Therefore, she argues, there has been a de facto expan-
sion of the theoretical formulations of the system and a move toward
the more liberal conception of the program.66
Without close scrutiny, Burns seems correct that all unemployed
workers should receive benefits unless a socially justified reason, such
as misconduct, warrants their exclusion. In practice however, such
theoretical conceptions do not hold true. Unfortunately, a restrictive
system which the law has perpetuated over the last fifty-five years is
still in place. Workers often face arbitrary eligibility requirements for
which, more often than not, no socially acceptable justification exists,
and often certain groups of workers have inadequate secondary
sources of child-care assistance.67
A. Child-Care Availability
This Part samples cases presenting problems facing working
mothers when courts deny them unemployment compensation when
they refuse to take a job or continue working because of child care.
The United States has a "jigsaw puzzle" of child care and preschool
education services.68 Unfortunately this puzzle is missing several very
61. Id.
62. Id. at 8-10.
63. Id. at 10.
64. Id. at 9-10.
65. Id. at 10.
66. Id. at 11. Bums' view, however, presupposes that women are on equal footing with
men in attaining available jobs in the work force and that the de facto expansion she refers to
encompasses income security for female as well as male workers. In reality, women are not yet
on equal terms with men. Thus, the question arises whether there is a genuine dichotomy in
coverage between male and female workers, expansive coverage for the former and restrictive
coverage for the latter).
67. Id. at 10; see NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASS'N, supra note 39, at 14.
68. See NATIONAL GOVERNORS' Ass'N, supra note 39, at 2.
[Vol. 46:751
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important pieces.69 There are two major sources, and one emerging
source, of child care in this country. Public programs, both federal
and state, and private care programs are currently the two major
providers of child care, with private employer facilities representing
an emerging source of such care.7" The availability of private care
facilities, however, does not warrant as much focus as the other two
sources, because private facilities tend to be used by middle- to upper-
class families who can afford to pay for such care, whereas most of the
cases studied here involve middle- to low- income factory and shift
workers who cannot afford private care for their children.71
In the present public systems there is an inconsistency between
the quality of the care provided and the cost.72 Strides have been
made in recent years as a result of an awareness of the problem of
child care, but these laws and support networks are still not enough to
relieve the burden of working parents who have children.73 The Fam-
ily Support Act, which provides child care to welfare recipients, has
been a first step toward a comprehensive system of federal and state
child care in this country.74 However, there is still a lack of available
facilities for many families. Often, when a facility becomes available,
it is too expensive or the quality of care is very low." For example,
only nineteen states require training for family day-care providers. 6
Less than half the states require the child/staff ratio for two-year-olds
or four-year-olds recommended by the National Association for the
Education of Young Children.7 One of the weaknesses in state-
69. Id.
70. Id.; see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR STATISTICS, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW 41-56 (Jan. 1991). The Department of Labor notes
trends in state legislation to adopt laws facilitating employer child-care programs. Recent
changes include a Colorado law permitting the Department of Social Services to assist
employers applying for licenses for on-site child-care centers, a Louisiana law creating a 12-
member "Child Care Challenge Committee" to make recommendations for a program to
encourage employers to participate in child-care options for their employees, and a Minnesota
law amended to allow employees to use personal sick leave benefits to care for a sick child.
The Louisiana amendment also requires employers to provide up to 16 hours of unpaid leave a
year for a parent to attend school conferences and meetings which cannot be scheduled after
working hours. This encouraging new legislation illustrates states' recognition of the severity
of the child-care problem and their responses.
71. Sanchez v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 569 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1977); Shufelt v.
Department of Employment & Training, 531 A.2d 894 (Vt. 1987). For the most part, the
cases discussed in this Comment involve women in shift jobs who work in factories and plants
and receive minimum wage.
72. See NATIONAL GOVERNORS' Ass'N, supra note 39, at 2.
73. Id. at 2-3.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 4, 7.
76. Id. at 6.
77. Id. at 4.
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funded child-care programs today is that state policies terminate sub-
sidies to parents at a level below the actual cost of the child-care pro-
gram. Forced beyond their financial means,78 parents must seek other
forms of child care or, as many of the cases illustrate, leave their jobs
to provide care themselves.79 Although many of the states appear to
have child-care subsidy programs for low-income families, many of
these programs fall short of providing adequate care.
The demand for subsidized child care in this country cannot be
underestimated. Forty four states claim that the demand for such
care is greater than the slots available.8 0 Notably, there was a signifi-
cant decline in the amount of federal funding for child care in the
1980s. 1 This is ironic given the increasing number of women who
entered the workforce in the last decade and the resulting crisis of
child care facing the nation. Interestingly, only twenty-one states cur-
rently have an established parental leave policy in place, 2 and even
so, most of those only allow employees to take the maximum amount
of their accrued annual or sick leave. 3 Only four of those states pay
the employee's salary while she is on leave.8 4 The problem of child-
care availability becomes ominous when these statistics are consid-
ered. In a study done by the Census Department on Child Care
Arrangements for the winter of 1986-1987, the following results were
tabulated.8 Of all the grade-school-age children with working
mothers in the United States during that year, 71% used kindergarten
and grade school as their primary day care source.8 6 For the remain-
ing 29%, secondary sources of care were necessary because the aver-
age workday extended beyond school-day care hours.87 The survey
also indicated that approximately 800,000 children were left
unsupervised for most of the hours that their mothers worked. 8
The unavailability of child care affects low-income families dra-
matically. In the fall of 1987, about 8% of employed women with
children under fifteen were living in poverty, 9 and of all the families
living in poverty, over half were maintained by female heads of house-
78. Id. at 7.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 14.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 23.
83. Id.
84. Id.




89. Id. at 11.
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holds. 9° This statistic takes on importance when coupled with the
fact that women in poverty spent approximately 25% of their
monthly income on child care, compared with 6% by women in non-
poverty line families. 9' The lack of adequate subsidized facilities in
this country and the prohibitive cost of available care exacerbates the
problem of working mothers having to quit their jobs or refuse suita-
ble work because they have no viable child-care options. The policy
implications of such conclusions are staggering in light of the impor-
tance of family as a place of solace and strength to all people, irrespec-
tive of class. It is estimated that forty-four states appropriated a total
of one billion dollars in 1989 to public child care,9 2 whereas estimated
private expenditures were about fifteen billion dollars. 93 The disparity
between the two figures is astonishing given the statistics on the
number of families in poverty,94 and of those, the number headed by
females. 95
Another reason for the increase in the child-care problem is that
families can no longer depend on relatives to keep children while both
parents work.9 6 Female relatives, who before may not have worked,
are now working. 97 Economic realities require that all members of a
household, especially both parents, work. In light of the problems
revealed by the statistics, we must make quality child care accessible
and affordable.9
B. The Mechanics of the System
The current unemployment compensation system allocates funds
to workers on the basis of individual state eligibility requirements.99
The eligibility criteria are described in terms of disqualification and
are two-tiered: disqualification for voluntarily leaving employment
without showing "good cause," and disqualification for refusing suita-
90. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU, FACTS ON WORKING WOMEN 2 (Aug.
1989).
91. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 36, at 11.
92. See NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASS'N, supra note 39, at 17.
93. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 36, at 10.
94. See id.
95. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Unpublished Data, supra note 1.
96. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 36, at 5.
97. Id.
98. Although this part focuses on problems associated with child care, many of these same
arguments can be made with respect to workers who may be forced to care for an elderly or
sickly parent or relative. Therefore, urging inclusion of child care as good cause in the statutes
should lead to an adoption of these personal reasons as good cause for voluntarily leaving a job
or refusing suitable work.
99. Williams, supra note 47, at 286-87.
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ble work without showing "good cause. ' '" °" The "good cause" provi-
sion plays a dual role in the determination of benefits; therefore,
characterization of child care as "good cause" for leaving employ-
ment or refusing work becomes indispensable if working women are
to have a fair chance at receiving unemployment benefits. '°
Courts have considered challenges to the state eligibility require-
ments on several grounds. First, claimants argue that refusing a
working mother benefits on the basis that child care is voluntary
ignores history,0 2 public policy, and the biological difference between
women and men. 0 3 Second, claimants argue that child-care responsi-
bilities are "good cause" for refusing work."04 Lastly, claimants assert
that the stringent requirement that they be "willing, able and ready"
to work to meet the statutory availability criteria often excludes
mothers who are not immediately ready because of delays in securing
alterate sources of child care. 105
When a claimant applies for unemployment compensation, the
state agency in charge first examines why the claimant left her
employment. 106 If she left voluntarily for personal reasons, almost
universally the inquiry ends and benefits are denied.'07 If she left
involuntarily (discharged without cause), or in some states voluntarily
but for reasons attributable to the employer, then she passes the first
stage and the inquiry continues.0 8 The second step of the eligibility
test asks if the worker was offered any suitable employment since her
last job and, if she refused it, for what reason.0 9 If she refused other-
100. Louise F. Freeman, Able to Work and Available for Work, 55 YALE L.J. 123 (1945);
Menard, supra note 5; Casebeer, supra note 6, at 790 n.83.
101. Most jurisdictions define "good cause" under each of these two provisions separately.
The doctrine, for the most part, does not automatically assume that what qualifies as good
cause for voluntarily leaving a job also qualifies as good reason for refusing suitable work.
However, such a linkage seems logical, because the need to care for children is just as
compelling and should be equally as justifiable as good cause whether the parent leaves work
or refuses work.
102. Mintz & Kellogg, supra note 4; Pappas, supra note 4.
103. Sanchez v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 569 P.2d 740, 750 (Cal. 1977); Dowd,
supra note 3, at 437.
104. Claimants arguments vary from state to state, as the cases in this Comment illustrate.
See infra notes 119-25, 141 and accompanying text.
105. Nurmi v. Vermont Employment Sec. Bd., 197 A.2d 483 (Vt. 1964), overruled by
Shufelt v. Department of Employment & Training, 531 A.2d 894 (Vt. 1987). These cases
implicate pregnancy issues. The notions of "able" and "available" deny recognition of the
physiological conditions of pregnancy.
106. See generally Casebeer, supra note 6.
107. Katherine Kempfer, Disqualification for Voluntary Leaving and Misconduct, 55 YALE
L.J. 147 (1945).
108. Id.
109. See generally Menard, supra note 5 (explaining the process by which states decide what
work is suitable and whether an employee's refusal of a job was permissible).
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wise suitable work for personal reasons, again the majority of states
will deny her benefits, because she has not shown the good cause nec-
essary for eligibility under applicable statutes and has made herself
unavailable for work.110 If however, she shows good cause for refus-
ing offers of suitable work, in many states she still must pass an avail-
ability test to qualify for benefits. I I I Thus, even if she had good cause
for refusing suitable work, she may have so heavily restricted her pos-
sible hours or location of work that she has detached herself from the
labor market, and she is classified as unavailable for work and denied
benefits. ' 12
Determinations of good cause and availability for work, them-
selves stringent, are made even more so by ambiguities in state eligi-
bility statutes and by intricacies in the definitions of the terms
themselves. One of the main problems is that "good cause" has not
been defined clearly. Some states interpret good cause to mean only
those causes attributable to the employer, while other states such as
California leave the possibility open for good cause to include per-
sonal reasons by equating good cause with adequate cause.'
1 3
As society changes, so too should perceptions of the factors that
are important in an employee's life; therefore, definitions such as
"good cause" should not remain constant. Courts nonetheless oper-
ate today on the basis of what good cause encompassed thirty and
forty years ago when the original cases arose, rather than recognizing
other causes that have emerged with the dramatic change in the labor
force.
Another obstacle for unemployment compensation claimants is
meeting the three-prong definition of "availability"-the claimant
must be "willing, able, and ready" to accept suitable employment.'
1 4
"Willing" means that an employee must exercise due diligence to find
a job. 1 5 Often, in an attempt to curb benefit payments, states disqual-
ify claimants either because their search did not meet the diligence
standard or because the agency determined that the restrictions an
employee imposed on herself indicated an unwillingness to work.
116
Therefore, many claimants fail the eligibility test at this stage of the
I10. Id.
111. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 569 P.2d 740, 751 (Cal. 1977);
Shufelt v. Department of Employment & Training, 531 A.2d 894, 898 (Vt. 1987).
1.12. Sanchez, 569 P.2d at 751; Shufelt, 531 A.2d at 898.
113. See infra part III.D.
114. Aladdin Indus. Inc. v. Scott, 407 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Tenn. 1966); Freeman, supra note
100, at 123.
115. See Freeman, supra note 100, at 125-29.
116. Id.
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process. "Able" generally means physically capable of handling the
work.' 7 "Ready" means willing at once.III Of the three prongs, the
"readiness" requirement poses the greatest obstacle to working
mothers. This is because many working mothers with child-care
responsibilities are not immediately ready to accept a job opportunity.
Many cases interpreting the readiness requirement disqualify working
mothers because they have restricted their hours and locations." 9
Unemployment compensation cases often involve a determina-
tion of whether a claimant refused suitable work. Yet defining the
term "suitable" is problematic. The first cases interpretating state
unemployment compensation statutes treated suitable as meaning
"fitted... [in terms of] training [and] experience."' 20 Unfortunately,
after more than fifty years of jurisprudence in this area, courts still
interpret suitablility as fitting in skill, experience, and salary, rather
than taking into account other circumstances of the employee that
may render previously suitable employment unsuitable.' 2' The lack
of recognition of child-care responsibilities shows how a restrictive
view of suitability hinders women seeking unemployment. Under this
rigid definition of suitability, a woman who had previously held a fac-
tory job, was laid off, and then was offered new factory employment at
the same pay and time is classified as being offered suitable work,22
irrespective of whether her babysitter left or her husband died or
abandoned her in the interim, leaving her with new and pressing
child-care problems. Under most state systems, such a woman would
be denied benefits if she refuses to accept the job offered to her. As
long as the suitability, availability, and voluntarism requirements
remain formal and unyielding, the seriousness of domestic responsibil-
ity situations poses great barriers to women receiving benefits. The
inherent limitations of these terms is evident in the caselaw from the
six states examined in this Comment.
C. Voluntary Quits
"Voluntary quit" is a term used to describe when a mother
ceases work for personal reasons. It is important to examine this area
of unemployement compensaiton because almost all jurisdictions
refuse to recognize child care as good cause for voluntarily leaving a
117. Id.
118. Id. at 129-34.
119. Aladdin Indus. Inc. v. Scott, 407 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Tenn. 1966).
120. Freeman, supra note 100, at 125.
121. Nurmi v. Vermont Employment Sec. Bd., 197 A.2d 483, 486 (Vt. 1964), overruled by




job. 2 3 Certain exceptions do exist; California as a matter of course,
and certain other states in specific instances, recognize child care as
good cause.' 2 4 The majority of states exclude child care from the
rubric of good cause by inserting the words "attributable to the
employer" after the voluntary good-cause provisions.'25 Florida's
statute, for example, states: "An individual shall be disqualified for
benefits... in which [she] has voluntarily left [her] employment with-
out good cause attributable to the employer" and states: "good cause
as used in this subsection shall include only such cause as is attributa-
ble to the employer ... ,,126 The Florida statute and others like it
have successfully excluded any reasons outside the employment con-
text, including all domestic responsibilities, from the definition of
good cause. In states like Florida, employer fault becomes the deci-
sive factor in determining eligibility for unemployment compensa-
tion.'27 The fixation on employer conduct is incongruous with one of
the supposed objectives of the unemployment system: the promotion
of employee general welfare.'
28
Most jurisdictions follow the Florida model in their statutory
language and case law in denying benefits to working women with
families who voluntarily leave their jobs. 29 By contrast, California
has left the door open in its statutory language for recognition of
child-care issues. Section 1256 of the California Unemployment
Insurance Code reads: "An individual is disqualified for unemploy-
ment compensation benefits if the director finds that he or she left his
or her most recent work voluntarily without good cause .... - 3 o The
absence of the words "attributable to the employer" frees the Califor-
123. Casebeer, supra note 6, at 792 n.87; Kempfer, supra note 107, at 156-57.
124. Sanchez v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 569 P.2d 740, 750 (Cal. 1977); Shufelt v.
Department of Employment & Training, 531 A.2d 894, 899 (Vt. 1987).
125. Beard v. State Dep't of Commerce, Div. of Employment Sec., 369 So. 2d 382, 385 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
126. FLA. STAT. § 443.101 (1989) (emphasis added). Although the statute indicates that
the claimant is only disqualified for the week in which she left her job, such disqualification
continues under subsection (1)(a) until she is reemployed and has worked the number of weeks
necessary for benefits). See id.
127. Earle V. Simrell, Employer Fault vs. General Welfare as the Basis of Unemployment
Compensation, 55 YALE L.J. 181, 182 (1945).
128. Id. at 184-85. Such restrictive language suggests that the purpose was never in fact
general welfare, as it excludes all those workers whose unemployment results from their
personal fault. There still exists the notion that a mother who gets pregnant or leaves a job to
take care of her children is at fault, and thus, she does not qualify for benefits under a system
which only provides insurance for workers unemployed through no personal fault.
129. Aladdin Indus. Inc. v. Scott, 407 S.W.2d 161 (Tenn. 1966); Nurmi v. Vermont
Employment Sec. Bd., 197 A.2d 483 (Vt. 1964), overruled by Shufelt v. Department of
Employment & Training, 531 A.2d 894 (Vt. 1987).
130. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256 (Deering 1985).
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nia courts to construe good cause to encompass child-care responsibil-
ities. Therefore, the first part of the eligibility test referred to
previously turns on whether child-care responsibilities are included in
the definition of good cause.
D. State Requirements: Voluntary Quits and Refusal
of Suitable Work
1. FLORIDA
In Beard v. State Department of Commerce, Division of Employ-
ment Security,' the Florida Second District Court of Appeal inter-
preted the good cause provision of the voluntary quit section of the
statute literally. 32 The case dealt with a woman who quit her job
when her employer required her to work the night shift (11:45 p.m. to
7:45 a.m.), a time when she usually stayed home with her two teenage
children.'33 She first requested her accrued annual leave to make
arrangements for child care before starting her new shift, but she was
denied this leave. 134 Thereupon, she voluntarily left her employ-
ment. 1 35 The court, in affirming the decision of the unemployment
compensation commission appeals referee, stated that according to
section 443.06(1) of the Florida Statutes, 136 if an employee voluntarily
leaves her employment it must be for good cause attributable to the
employer.1 37 The court reasoned that because the claimant left for
child-care reasons and not due to any fault of the employer, she was
ineligible for benefits.' 38 The court rejected the argument that the
employer's denial of vacation time to search for appropriate child care
forced the woman to leave her job.139 In a narrow interpretation of
the statutory language, the court stated that she quit her job before
having made any efforts to secure child care; thus, the employer's
denial of leave did not directly cause her to quit her job.1" Through a
technical reading of the statute, the court effectively delivered a
message about unemployment compensation: no personal reasons,
however compelling, constitute good cause for voluntarily leaving a
job.
131. 369 So. 2d 382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 383.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. FLA. STAT. § 443.06(1) (1979), replaced by FLA. STAT. § 443.10 (1989).
137. Id. at 384-85.
138. Id.




The Beard court justified its decision in part by distinguishing it
from Yordamlis v. Florida Industrial Commission,14 ' a 1963 decision
by the Florida Third District Court of Appeal. In Yordamlis, the
court granted benefits to a male claimant who had both voluntarily
left his job and refused suitable employment because of his child-care
responsibilities.142 At the time of that decision, section 443.06(1) of
the Florida Statutest4 3 merely stated that a claimant could not volun-
tarily leave employment without good cause. I" The Yordamlis court,
stating that "[the] petitioner had valid personal reasons to terminate
the employment which required him to work until 9:00 [p.m.] and to
refuse to accept a job which would require a substantial amount of
night work," included child care in the good cause provision.'45 The
court in Beard distinguished Yordamlis by pointing out that the 1963
amendment to section 443.06(1) adding the words "attributable to the
employer" meant that the legislature "must have intended to remove
domestic obligations as good cause for voluntary termination."'
'
16
The amendment, the court said, accounted for the difference in result
between the two cases.' 47 Although the court's analysis in Beard
referencing the amendment may be technically correct, other policy
reasons may have affected the court's decision. First, the legislature's
amendment to the statute narrowed considerably the definition of
good cause for leaving employment in Florida.148 Second, Yordamlis
involved a male staying home with his children, whereas Beard-the
first opportunity the court had to consider the interpretation of the
amended legislation-involved a woman attempting to assert this
same right. The policy change resulting from the amendment lowers
the concerns of working families on Florida's list of legislative priori-
ties. The implications of this are not complimentary to either the
judicial or legislative system in Florida.
Another interesting aspect of the court's analysis in Beard is its
treatment of the connection between the good cause provision for vol-
141. 158 So. 2d 791 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
142. Id. at 792.
143. FLA. STAT. § 443.06(l) (1961).
144. Id. at 791; see also Beard, 369 So. 2d at 384.
145. Yordamlis, 158 So. 2d at 792.
146. Beard, 369 So. 2d at 385.
147. Id. at 384.
148. It is interesting to contemplate the mindset of the Florida legislators who created this
amendment and to wonder if they ere aware that it would result in excluding domestic
responsibility from the ambit of permissible good causes for voluntarily leaving a job. Perhaps
they were, since Florida has always been a pro-employer state, as evident from the continuous
support that the at-will doctrine receives in its courts. See, e.g., DeMarco v. Publix
Supermarkets Inc., 384 So. 2d 1253 (1980) (holding that employees may be fired at the will of
their employers, regardless of cause).
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untarily leaving a job and the good cause provision for refusing suita-
ble work. ' 49 Although the primary issue before the Beard court was
not refusal of suitable work, but voluntary leaving, the court nonethe-
less analyzed the relationship of the good cause clause of both provi-
sions in other jurisdictions. 50 Beard does not actually resolve the
good cause issue, but it suggests that it would follow the Vermont
Supreme Court's decision in Nurmi v. Vermont Employment Security
Board, '' where the court, interpreting a statute similar to Florida's,
decided that because the good cause provision of the "voluntary quit"
section of the statute permitted only reasons attributable to the
employer, the good cause provision of the "refusing suitable work"
section also required reasons attributable to the employer. 52 The
interpretation effectively eliminates domestic responsibilities as good
cause in Vermont. The Beard court stopped short of accepting that
analysis, but the language of the opinion suggests that should a simi-
lar case arise the court would not be unwilling to make such a connec-
tion. 53 This will be extremely detrimental to unemployment
compensation claimants in Florida. 54
149. Beard, 369 So. 2d at 384.
150. Id.
151. Nurmi v. Vermont Employment Sec. Bd., 197 A.2d 483 (Vt. 1964), overruled by
Shufelt v. Department of Employment & Training, 531 A.2d 894 (Vt. 1987).
152. Id. at 384-85.
153. Id.
154. The controversial issue is whether the two good cause provisions should be treated the
same or differently. Those who advocate treating them differently argue- that to add the words
"attributable to the employer" onto the voluntary quit disqualification section of the statute
(and not the suitable work section) makes more sense because the inquiry is focusing on a
worker who independently and willfully left her job. Advocates of this position justify their
vision with notions of employer prerogative and the need for continuous production. Such a
position examines and restricts good cause from the viewpoint of the employer only; therefore,
requiring causes solely attributable to the employer would appear quite sound. On the other
hand, advocates suggest that good cause for refusing suitable work should be treated
differently because we are no longer dealing with an employed individual, but rather one who
is on the outside of the existing, thriving labor force. In this scenario the possibility that other,
non-employer forces could be at work in causing the claimant to refuse suitable work is
greater, and thus, theoretically, more room exists for a broader good cause provision. Also,
the claimant refusing suitable work does not pose the threat of interrupting production and the
flow of capital by walking off a job. These two factors, the reasoning goes, serve as legitimate
enough reasons why the two good cause provisions should be treated differently in the statutes.
The disagreement with that view, however, is twofold: first, and important, the
justification for including the words "attributable to the employer" are not at all convincing.
Why should the possibility of production stoppage or a slowing in the movement of capital
translate into more restrictive categories into which reasons for leaving a job should fall? The
concerns of a parent will be the same when confronted with a sick child or another child-care
crisis, whether that parent is faced with leaving a job or refusing suitable work. The only
difference is timing. A parent who needs to be home with a child, who already has a job and
must leave faces the restrictive good cause provisions embodied in the "attributable to the
employer" clauses; yet a parent who is already out of work and needs to stay home technically
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
The requirement that availability encompasses "willing, able,
and ready" serves to limit the benefits granted to claimants.,55
Although the majority of cases examined in reference to the denial of
unemployment compensation benefits deal with child-care responsi-
bility, rigid eligibility requirements similarly affect pregnant women
and force them to make difficult decisions about work and family. In
School Board of Volusia County v. Florida Department of Labor and
Employment Security, 56 the court dismissed the claim of a pregnant
teacher who left her job under an unpaid maternity leave program
and subsequently applied for unemployment compensation. 57 The
case involved the second of the three parts of the availability test.""
The court found that because of her pregnancy, the teacher was not
able to work and not actively seeking a job; thus, she was unavailable
for work and ineligible for benefits.5 9 School Board of Volusia County
is an example of how the seemingly neutral unemployment compensa-
tion laws adversely affect pregnant women, who are often incapable of
working as they had before. Neither this court nor a majority of other
courts in the United States"6 have made allowances for the impact
faces a less restrictive good cause provision. The distinction, however, is groundless. The
concerns are just as serious and justified at both stages. These parents have no choice, because
they must manage responsibilities of both family and work without allowing either to suffer.
Secondly, if the courts' doctrine truly followed the "difference" analysis to its logical
conclusion, it would allow many more personal reasons to qualify as good cause under the
suitable work provisions of the statutes than under the voluntary quit provision. But the
reality is that such broad allowances do not currently exist in the doctrine of the courts; rather,
in most jurisdictions, the good cause provision for suitable work is treated just as restrictively
as that for voluntarily leaving a job. Furthermore, treatment of good cause in both types of
cases is the same. If Florida were to adopt the thesis of this Comment, by not only treating the
two good cause provisions alike, but by dropping the employer causation language from the
statute, it would require a complete overhaul of the present courts' thinking. Such an adoption
would affect decisions in many others areas, making inconsistent a substantial part of the
employment doctrine of the state. This is so because adherence to the view of similar
treatment for the two provisions would mean a relinquishing the idealogy of employer
prerogative. Florida, a leading proponent of the at-will doctrine and a general pro-employer
state, would then have an unemployment doctrine at odds with itself-making allowances for
a worker's right of self-determination while supporting the objectives of a pro-management
state. Arguably, a recognition of this potential inconsistency continually drives the court in its
decisions to reject an interpretation of the statutory provisions which would treat the two good
cause provisions similarly, even though it may recognize the pressing problem of child-care
issues in the workforce.
155. Williams, supra note 47.
156. School Bd. of Volusia County v. Florida Dep't of Labor & Employment Sec., 393 So.
2d 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
157. Id. at 72.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n of Mo., 479 U.S. 511 (1987) (denying
a pregnant woman unemployment compensation benefits).
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that such an eligibility requirement has on pregnant women with
reduced physical capacity. Thus, the underlying assumptions about
choice which still exist in our judicial system greatly influence court
decisions, particularly in unemployment compensation doctrine.
The soundness of the current doctrine which burdens these
women is subject to question. At the base of the doctrine is the belief
of the courts that pregnancy and child care are matters of real choice
to working women in our society today. Yet, as child-bearers, women
do not have a meaningful choice in these matters. Even though work-
ing women literally can choose not to become pregnant, to assume or
require that all working women would or should make that choice is
unrealistic. If the judicial system continues to view these as matters
of pure choice, the system and society will not readily change. For so
many women today who work as part of dual-income families,'61 the
notion of choice or placing pregnancy or family on hold until they no
longer have to work is an unrealistic viewpoint because, most likely,
these women will always have to work. The question goes even
deeper than that. Why should women even have to think in such
terms? Most men have never had to make such choices. For genera-
tions the workplace has been accommodating men with children.'62
Yet when women are faced with these issues, our laws and those who
interpret them conjure up the idea of free choice, and thus, refuse to
accommodate such situations equally. Today, working women have
no true choice in the economic order. Decisions that perpetuate such
outdated assumptions about women and their choice to work or have
families do nothing to refocus our legal system on some of the most
pressing issues facing society at this time.
2. TENNESSEE
Aladdin Industries, Inc. v. Scott,163 a landmark case, involved a
female employee who left her job when her employer changed her
from a day to a night shift.'6' The employee left her job voluntarily
rather than accept a change in shift because she had three children
and her husband worked nights.165 She was never informed when she
was hired that she might have to work other shifts, yet her employer
161. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS (Jan. 1990).
162. Yordamlis v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 158 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963); see
generally Teitelbaum, supra note 15 (explaining the traditional workforce comprised of men
who did not have to worry about child-care because their wives took care of the children while
they worked).
163. 407 S.W.2d 161 (Tenn. 1966).




claimed that it informed all employees of that possibility, as standard
company procedure.' 66
Aladdin incorporated the ideas of good cause for both voluntarily
quitting a job and for refusing suitable work.167 It is unlike most of
the Florida cases which separate these issues and treat the good-cause
provisions differently. The Aladdin court found the employee ineligi-
ble for unemployment compensation benefits because she both volun-
tarily left her job and refused suitable work without good cause. 1 6 By
restricting her hours and refusing such employment, she made herself
unavailable for work and thus unemployable. 169 The court found that
child care did not constitute good cause for either of the above criteria
of the eligibility test. 7 0 In deciding the issue, the court aptly captured
the underlying fear of many courts deciding these issues when it
stated: "To uphold the decision of the Board of Review would be
placing in the hands of the employee the right to determine when and
under what conditions she would work. Such a holding would unduly
restrict the employer and could conceivably, under certain circum-
stances, make it almost impossible to carry on a business during cer-
tain hours."'' Thus, the unstated impetus behind the courts'
doctrinal formulation appears to be managerial prerogatives.' 72 The
court in Aladdin disregarded the employee's contention that she was
never directly informed about the possibility of changing shifts and
focused instead upon her unavailability, not on the reasons for her
unavailability. 7 3 Aladdin reflects a pattern of cases in Tennessee in
which employees are denied unemployment compensation benefits
based on their unavailability for work rather than any examination as
to the reasons for such unavailability.
166. Id.
167. Id.




172. The term "managerial prerogatives" refers to the assumption, present in the common
law, that certain rights and freedoms are necessarily exclusively vested in the employer. This
is coupled with the economic principle that power in the workplace should be centralized. See
generally JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW
(1983). These notions of managerial prerogatives and concern for the ultimate flexibility of
capital within the market are not unique to the doctrinal developments in this body of law.
Rather, it is present in the continuing doctrinal stronghold of the at-will regime in the United
States today. It is also present in the area of labor law as evidenced by the courts' and
legislatures' denial of protection to workers engaged in partial strikes because employee
slowdowns are seen as efforts to usurp management control and to interrupt the free flow of
commerce. See Audubon Health Care Center, 268 NLRB 135, 137 (1983) (prohibiting partial
strikes because they usurp the employer's managerial prerogative).
173. Aladdin, 407 S.W.2d at 162-64.
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Katherine Kempfer, in her discussion of the voluntary quit pro-
visions of state statutes, says that such strict requirements reflect bad
policy choices with respect to the overall system of unemployment
compensation.1 74 She states that the provisions often penalize women
who must leave their job for family concerns. 75  She notes that the
definition of good cause is arbitrary and unsupported. 76 She also
claims that although the original reasons behind the voluntary quit
limitations may have been sound, as society and the work force
change, those limitations can no longer be justified.
77
Kempfer's points are well-taken because the voluntary quit dis-
qualification provision does, in fact, serve as an overall discrimination
against working mothers, as the caselaw illustrates. Kempfer asserts
that our laws will not change until society as a whole signals its
approval of child-care responsibilities as a socially justifiable reason
for voluntarily leaving employment. 78 Arguably however, until the
law first recognizes and legitimizes these reasons for leaving, society
will not become aware of the problems to the extent that it should and
consequently will not give its approval to these issues.
If courts were to view decisions to stop work based on of child-
care responsibilities as involuntary, rather than a true reflection of
workers' volition to stop working, perhaps the court would be more
likely to include such responsibilities as good cause for voluntarily
leaving employment.' 79 However, if we continue to view parents who
leave work to care for their children as attempting to take advantage
of the unemployment system, or if we continue to believe that families
have any true choice when they face these problems, the law will
never change. Perhaps the inherent problem is that the deci-
sionmakers in this country are so far removed from such problems
that they do not realize the limitations that such strict unemployment
eligibility requirements impose on the average worker. Viewing deci-
sions about domestic responsibilities as a matter of choice perpetuates
the current prejudicial impact of voluntary clause provisions.
174. Kempfer, supra note 107, at 148.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 149.
178. See Kempfer, supra note 107.
179. Paul H. Sanders, Disqualification for Unemployment Insurance, 8 VAND. L. REV. 307,
320-23 (1955). Sanders suggests that if the notion of choice is not a factor in the court's
analysis, circumstances which preclude working due to child-care responsibilities will be seen





Prior to 1987, the leading case on unemployment compensation
in Vermont was Nurmi v. Vermont Employment Security Board.8'
The Nurmi decision, although now overruled,' 8' is a significant exam-
ination of the legal treatment of unemployment compensation child-
care cases in Vermont. It represents a conservative legal analysis used
by the courts throughout the state from the initial years of unemploy-
ment compensation to 1987. In Nurmi, the Supreme Court of Ver-
mont denied unemployment compensation benefits to a group of
women who had previously worked the night shift, were laid off, were
offered positions on the day shift, and refused to accept those jobs
because of their child-care responsibilities during the day. 18 2 The
court treated the issue as whether the women had made themselves
unavailable for work by limiting the shifts they would work. 183 At the
time, the Vermont eligibility statute stated that an individual was dis-
qualified for benefits if the commission found that she "has failed,
without good cause, either to apply for available, suitable work.., or
to accept suitable work when offered to [her] ..1.8.""4 The court rea-
soned that because the women's refusal to work was not attributable
to the employer in any way and because their child-care responsibili-
ties were not "compelling reason[s] beyond [their] control," the
women were not entitled to benefits.
8 5
There are two problems with the court's analysis in Nurmi.
First, the court made an illogical leap in its interpretation of the good
cause provision of the statute. The court stated that because an
employee cannot voluntarily quit her employment "except for good
cause attributable to such employing unit," it implies that she also
cannot refuse suitable employment offered to her except for good
cause attributable to the same employing unit. However, nowhere in
the suitability provision of the statute is such limiting language found.
Therefore, according to the rules of strict statutory construction, the
court made an unjustifed leap. Second, the court stated that because
the women restricted their working hours to the night shift, they
automatically made themselves unavailable for work.'8 6 In making
180. 197 A.2d 483 (Vt. 1964), overruled by Shufelt v. Department of Employment &
Training, 531 A.2d 894 (Vt. 1987).
181. Shufelt v. Department of Employment & Training, 531 A.2d 894 (Vt. 1987)
(overruling Nurmi v. Vermont Employment Sec. Bd., 197 A.2d 483 (Vt. 1964).
182. Nurmi, 197 A.2d at 485.
183. Id.
184. See id. (quoting VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 1344(3) (1961)).
185. Id. at 487 (quoting LeClere v. Administrator, 78 A.2d 550, 551 (Conn. 1951)).
186. Id.
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this determination the court failed to distinguish between women who
remove themselves completely from the labor market and those who
maintain a limited attachment to the market. Since one of the goals
of unemployment compensation being to maintain some level of
security for unemployed workers seeking jobs, it seems incongruous
to be so quick to deny benefits for a mere narrowing of availability in
the labor market, especially when the reasons for doing so are so
important. The Nurmi court apparently did not think that family and
child-care responsibilities were so important, because it refused to rec-
ognize them as good (enough) cause to turn down suitable
employment. 
87
In re Prouty, 88 another Vermont case, used a similar analysis. In
that case the court denied benefits to a claimant who limited her avail-
ability to the first shift because of child-care and family responsibili-
ties.' 89 The court stated that restricting herself to one shift when
suitable work was available on two shifts was tantamount to refusing
suitable work.19 Having established the refusal of suitable work, the
court then added that the only way such a refusal is justified is for
good cause, which the claimant has the burden of showing. 191 Once
again the court did not recognize domestic responsibilities as sufficient
good cause to refuse work and denied the claimant benefits. 92
These Vermont cases and those in other states dealing with these
issues illustrate the fundamental lack of awareness of the conflict,
especially for low-income families, between job and home responsibili-
ties. This lack of awareness, coupled with state statutes that do not
uniformly define what constitutes good cause, leads to decisions that
burden women with families and that do nothing to change the cur-
rently male-biased nature of the law. 9 a
In the 1982 case of Hunt v. Department of Employment Secur-
ity,'94 the Supreme Court of Vermont, once again denying benefits to
a worker who refused suitable work due to lack of transportation,
outrightly stated a belief which no doubt had been underlying deci-
sions of the court for many years. The court stated that in a system
operated by assessments against employers which are pooled into
187. Id.
188. 310 A.2d 12 (Vt. 1973).
189. Id. at 13.
190. Id. at 14.
191. Id. at 15.
192. Id.
193. Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemmas of the Gendered
Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 86 (1989).
194. 453 A.2d 391 (Vt. 1982).
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state funds to pay benefits, it would be against the objectives of the
policy behind unemployment compensation to increase an employer's
assessments when the employee is refusing suitable work due to no
direct fault of the employer, and moreover, where the same employer
is the one offering the claimant another job. 195 Can we afford to con-
tinue this employer protection, especially in the face of ineffective
social programs like unemployment compensation and with knowl-
edge that the family unit is breaking down? Until the courts recog-
nize an employee's interest in her job, 196 employers will continue to be
favored. Moreover, decisions of courts rooted in the principle that
"lesser harm to employers" is beneficial will perpetuate.
Thus, in Vermont, the prevailing view until 1987 on child-care
issues was based on an unarticulated set of assumptions about the
labor force as seen from a male perspective.' 97 The cases refused to
recognize domestic responsibilities as either good cause for volunta-
rily leaving employment or for refusing suitable work. Fortunately, in
1987 the Vermont Supreme Court changed its direction (perhaps
finally in recognition of a changing society) and overruled the long
standing Nurmi case.
98
In Shufelt v. Department of Employment and Training, the court
began a new trend in Vermont toward a recognition of child care as
good cause under the availability provisions of state unemployment
compensation statutes.199 The claimant in Shufelt was laid off from
her regular day shift. A month later her employer offered her a job on
the night shift, which she refused, stating that she was uncomfortable
leaving her three daughters at home alone.2°° The court presented the
issue in terms of whether child care was good cause for refusing suita-
ble work. It articulated a standard of reasonableness that focused on
what a reasonable person in the same circumstances would do.20 ' The
court cited Grenafege v. Department of Employment Security20 2 for
the proposition that our system of unemployment compensation is
195. Id. at 393. Hunt is a glaring example of how courts weigh families and employers on
the scales of justice. Even moderate costs to the employer appear to preclude all consideration
of the adverse impact these decisions have on families.
196. R. Michael Fischl, Some Realism About Critical Legal Studies, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV.
505, 526-28 (1987).
197. See, e.g., Hunt, 453 A.2d at 391; In re Prouty, 310 A.2d 12 (Vt. 1973); Nurmi v.
Vermont Employment Sec. Bd., 197 A.2d 483 (Vt. 1964), overruled by Shufelt v. Department
of Employment & Training, 531 A.2d 894 (Vt. 1987).
198. Shufelt v. Department of Employment & Training, 531 A.2d 894, 896 (Vt. 1987).
199. Id. at 898.
200. Id. at 895.
201. Id. at 898.
202. 357 A.2d 118 (1976).
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remedial in nature and must be liberally construed in favor of
claimants.2 °3
In Nurmi, the court assumed that the requirement of good cause
attributable to the employer for voluntarily quitting a job also applied
to the refusal to accept suitable work, even in the absense of any statu-
tory language to support such a proposition." The court in Shufelt,
however, followed a much stricter statutory construction and stated
that good cause to refuse work need not necessarily be tied to the
employer.2 °5 The Shufelt court instead considered domestic responsi-
bilities as good cause under the availability portion of the statute. In
doing so, the court followed the ruling of the Rhode Island Supreme
Court in Huntly v. Department of Employment Security,21 6 which
stated that "parental responsibility may constitute good cause for lim-
iting availability, so long as such limitation does not substantially
impair a claimant's attachment to the labor market. ' 20 7 Thus both
Huntley and Shufelt went one step further than Nurmi. First, the
Shufelt court recognized child care as good cause.208 It then stated
that the determination must be made as to whether, even with good
cause, the claimants own restrictions "substantially impaired [her]
attachment to the labor market. ' ' 209 Unlike the court in Nurmi, the
Shufelt court did not assume that the claimant automatically made
herself unavailable by restricting her attachment to the labor mar-
ket.210 The Shufelt court, although recognizing parental responsibil-
ity as good cause, did limit the reasonableness standard which it set
forth. It stated that in each case the reasonableness of the child care
must be judged according to the age and number of children and to
what the actions of similarly situated parents would be.211 By doing
so, the court stopped short of declaring all parental responsibilities as
constituting good cause.
Given the long tradition in Vermont of denying all benefits for
any personal and voluntary refusals of work, this is not surprising.
Yet the Shufelt court did not go far enough in erradicating all doubts
about whether child-care responsibilities constitute good cause. It did
not do so because the court still held "the burden rests with the claim-
203. Id. at 120.
204. Nurmi, 197 A.2d at 486-87.
205. Shufelt, 531 A.2d at 897.
206. 397 A.2d 902 (R.I. 1979).
207. Shufelt, 531 A.2d at 898 (quoting Huntley, 397 A.2d at 906).
208. Id. at 898.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 899.
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ant to show that the refusal was for good cause, ' 2 12 and in so doing
the claimant also has the burden of establishing the reasonableness of
her actions.21 3 In light of the precedent in Vermont, the chances that
a claimant may be able to sustain the burden that child care is good
cause are quite low. Prior to Shufelt, which attempted to change the
course of unemployment jurisprudence as it affects parents, Vermont
gave no recognition to parental needs. In Vermont today, claimants
may still encounter resistance in the courts on unemployment com-
pensation claims, especially if the facts vary even slightly from those
in Shufelt. It is uncertain whether one case is sufficient to truly
change the course of the law given the limitations of a reasonableness
standard rather than a presumption that child care is good cause with
no burden of proof on the claimant.
4. CALIFORNIA
A germinal case in unemployment compensation law is Sanchez
v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board,21 4 decided by the
Supreme Court of California in 1977. Sanchez represents a minority
but progressive viewpoint on the issue of child care and unemploy-
ment compensation benefits. Maria Sanchez was an unemployed
waitress who applied for unemployment compensation benefits. She
informed the Department of Employment Development that she
could not accept work on Saturdays and Sundays because she had to
stay at home with her four-year-old son.215 Before Maria became
unemployed, her sister had looked after the child, but her sister had
returned to Mexico.21 6 Maria also informed the Department that she
was available for waitressing jobs and factory work.217 She was avail-
able to work at either of these jobs during the week and on any
shift.21 The Department concluded that her self-imposed exclusion
from weekend work made her unavailable for work under the Califor-
nia unemployment compensation statute, and thus she was ineligible
for benefits. 21 9 A hearing referee, the Unemployment Compensation
Review Board, and a California Superior Court affirmed the Depart-
ment's rejection of benefits. 220 The superior court noted that her
212. Id. at 896.
213. Id.
214. 569 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1977).
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exclusion from weekend work had "materially reduced her opportuni-
ties for employment" and thus she was unavailable for work under
the statute.22 The Supreme Court of California reversed, stating that
the lower court had applied an incorrect standard of availability
which had adversely affected the outcome.222
It is important to note, as did the California Supreme Court,22 a
that Sanchez is not about the voluntary quit provision of the statute.
Rather it implicates the availability requirement of section 1253 and
the definitions of the terms within that section. According to section
1253 a claimant must be "able to work and available for work" 224 to
qualify for benefits. A claimant is disqualified from benefits if she
"without good cause, refuse[s] to accept suitable employment when
offered to [her], or fail[s] to apply for suitable work when notified by a
public employment office."' 225 The Board offered three justifications
for its interpretation of the availability standard.226 First, it con-
cluded that any restriction by the employee which would "materially
reduce" her possibilities for work would render her unavailable under
the statute.227 Second, the Board interpreted the provision to require
that a claimant be available for work "as is customarily or ordinarily
required by work in his usual occupation. ' 22 Finally, the Board con-
cluded that the claimant had virtually always worked on weekends. 229
The Supreme Court of California pointed out that the Board did
not explore the concepts of suitable work or good cause in the three
justifications for the standard. 230 The court, reading section 1253 lit-
erally, stated that the threshold questions in these cases are (a)
whether the work was suitable, and (b) whether the claimant had
good cause for refusing such suitable work. 231 The court determined
that allowing the standard adopted by the Board to stand would nul-
lify the suitable work provision of the statute.232 This is so because if
a court takes a refusal to work at specified times as evidence of general
unavailability for work, as the Board did, and does not inquire into
the suitability of the work or the reasons for refusals, then possibly all
221. Id. at 744.
222. Id. at 749.
223. Id. at 743 n.3.
224. Id. at 743 n.4.
225. Id. at 744.
226. Id.
227. Id.







refusals of unsuitable work and all good reasons for refusing work
would render workers unavailable under the statute. The Supreme
Court of California stated that both suitability and good cause must
be considered.23 3 The court used these two definitions to limit the
scope of the availability requirement. Availability in itself concerns
certain economic needs, whereas the suitability and good cause provi-
sions refer to the particular employee's needs.234 Thus, the court set
up a two-step test of availability. First, there must be an inquiry into
the suitability of the job and the causes for refusals. Second, once a
claimant has restricted her market to suitable work for which she has
no good cause to refuse, the court must determine whether the claim-
ant's market is so small that she has effectively made herself unavaila-
ble for work for which there is a substantial field of potential
employment.235 In other words, "the initial test of willingness to
accept suitable employment will be followed by an inquiry into the
size of the market for suitable labor.
236
The establishment of this two-step test by the court is significant
in that it goes one step deeper than most courts do in determining
eligibility requirements. In rejecting the notion that one's unavailabil-
ity to accept a particular job offer is itself immediate cause for disqual-
ification, the court first requires an examination of the work offered to
see if it is suitable and whether there was good cause for rejecting it.
Once those determinations are made, then the court examines availa-
bility in terms of attachment to the labor force. This is important
with respect to child care because it opens the door for an argument
that child care should fall under both of those two inquiries in being
classified as good cause for refusing work and as a consideration in
determining whether work is suitable.
The court in Sanchez takes this extra step by following Garcia v.
California Employment Stabilization Committee.237 Garcia held that
a claimant cannot be required to be available for unsuitable work or
work for which she has good cause to refuse, so long as she remains
available to a substantial employment field. 238 The claimant in Garcia
lacked transportation to get to a job, and the court declared that to be
good cause for refusing such suitable work.239 Garcia was thus an
important precedent not merely because it initiated this two-step
233. Id. at 748- 49.
234. Id. at 746.
235. Id. at 746-47.
236. Id. at 747.
237. 161 P.2d 972 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1945).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 974.
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methodology, but also because it demonstrated a willingness on the
part of the California courts to expand the definition of good cause to
include various nonemployment related reasons such as personal
problems.
The Sanchez court alluded to the necessity of having a "more
realistic and flexible test of suitability, good cause and actual labor
market exposure." 2" Having established a broader test than that
used by the lower court, the California Supreme Court then looked at
the lower court's decision in light of its newly articulated test. First,
it pointed out that at no time in the lower court proceedings was there
a determination as to whether weekend work was suitable work for
Maria Sanchez.24 The court did not explore this omission except to
state that an inquiry into the suitability of the actual work offered is
always necessary under its newly established test.242
However, it is quite possible (and even likely) that had the court
further explored the suitability question, it would have held that
weekend work was not suitable for Maria Sanchez. Such a conclusion
is reasonable because the court's reasoning linked the ideas of suitabil-
ity and good cause.243 It inquired into both of these issues before it
determined availability. Also, the court declared in its opinion that
child care is indeed a good reason for refusing suitable employment,
based on concrete references to the policy behind the system.2 " Thus,
the assumption that the court would not be hard pressed to conclude
that child care should also factor into a determination of suitability is
not far-fetched.
Early in its opinion, the Sanchez court restated the statutory pro-
vision on suitability.245 It stated that when a determination of suita-
bility is made, "risk to health, safety, and morals" must be taken into
account.246 Those words offer potential for those advocating child
care as a factor in a suitability determination. The Sanchez court later
pointed out that "parents of a child are under an obligation to give
[her] support and education suitable to [her] circumstances. And
they may be subject to criminal penalties if they neglect their
duties. ' 247 The court may have meant that parents, and society as a
whole, have a moral responsibility to care for children. This moral
240. Sanchez, 569 P.2d at 748.
241. Id. at 749.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 750.
245. Id. at 744 n.6.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 749.
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imperative falls under the rubric of the "health, safety, and morals"
provision of the statutory suitability requirements.248 Such an inter-
pretation of the "health, safety, and morals" provisions would allow
universal reform in unemployment compensation law, since all stat-
utes contain such a provision. Progressive courts from states such as
California, Alaska, and Rhode Island could set the example for other
courts through doctrine that considers a parent's right to make moral
decisions about child care an important enough right of self-determi-
nation to classify as a factor in determining suitability. There would
then be three, rather than two, theories under which claimants could
challenge eligibility requirements based on child care: first, that child
care should be good cause for voluntarily leaving a job; second, that
child care is good cause to be unavailable for suitable work; and third,
that a denial of benefits causes a risk of the "health, safety, and
morals" of children because it forces their parents to neglect them.
The Sanchez decision brought these last two theories to light.
Sanchez next focused on the idea of child care as good cause for
being unavailable for suitable work. 24 9 This analysis sets this case
apart and puts it in a minority. The court combined notions of moral-
ity, law, and legislative policy in deciding that parental responsibilities
are good cause for refusing suitable employment. "Because of the
crucial importance of parental responsibility and supervision, it would
be anomalous if the Legislature intended that the obligation of the
prospective claimant of unemployment benefits to accept work be
irreconcilable with the duties of parenthood."250 Sanchez's discussion
of the balance between parental duties and work as a concern of the
unemployment compensation system is absent from the doctrine of
virtually all of the case law in this area. Sanchez held the good cause
provision out as a scale onto which it weighed conflicting
responsibilities.25
This recognition of the conflict between work and home also dis-
tinguishes the California court from most others in that a gendered
perspective seems absent from its doctrine. The language of Sanchez
appears to evolve from a broad perspective encompassing both a
female and a male voice.2"2 The language, which paints a picture of
the true dilemma that parents - especially women - face, is sympa-
248. See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1258 (West 1986) (describing the "health, safety, and
morals" consideration in suitable employment determinations).
249. Sanchez, 569 P.2d at 750.
250. Id. at 749.
251. Id.
252. Frances Olsen, The Sex of Law (1985) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
University of Miami Law Review).
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thetic, and takes into account the subjectivity and true lack of choice
involved in child-care decisions by working parents.253 The lack of
gender bias is unusual and suggests that there is more driving the
doctrine of the California courts than preconceived, rigid images of
what the workplace, the unemployment compensation system, or
child-care responsibilities should be.
Sanchez also differs in the meaning it attaches to "good cause."
Under its definition, good cause means "adequate" cause.254 If con-
servative courts like Florida and Tennessee defined good cause as the
California court has done, the outcomes of their cases might be differ-
ent. Changes in outcome in favor of claimants would be even more
likely if other courts interpreted good cause to mean adequate cause
not only for refusing suitable work, but also for voluntarily leaving a
job. Sanchez did not limit its definition of good cause to the suitability
provision. In fact, the court stated that
the responsibilities our laws place on parents, and the importance
to their children and society that those duties be discharged, man-
date that the "good cause" concept not be defined so narrowly as
to compel unemployed parents who remain available to a signifi-
cant labor market to fulfill their parental responsibilities only upon
pain of losing their unemployment benefits.255
The court concluded this section of the opinion by citing a 1968
North Carolina case256 which, referring to child care, stated, "it is
difficult to imagine a better cause for rejection of employment.
'257
Therefore the Sanchez court's decision was a great step towards hav-
ing the courts throughout the country recognize and legitimate the
importance of child care in today's labor market.
The last important aspect of Sanchez was the court's ruling on
the burden of proof.258 Sanchez reduced the claimant's burden some-
what by stating that with respect to the second part of the test-that
is, once a claimant has shown her availability for suitable work for
which she has no good cause to refuse, the burden of proving whether
she is available to a "substantial field of employment" is on the
Department. 25 9 Although Sanchez does free the claimant from carry-
ing the entire burden of proof, it still, like Shufelt, leaves upon the
claimant the burden of proving good cause for refusal of suitable
253. Sanchez, 569 P.2d at 749.
254. Id. at 750.
255. Id.
256. In re Watson, 161 S.E.2d 1, 7 (N.C. 1968).
257. Sanchez, 569 P.2d at 750 (quoting Watson, 161 S.E. 2d at 7)).




work. Therefore, the burden of proof makes it extremely difficult for
claimants to win.2" Rather than making the burden of proof prohibi-
tive, the courts should allocate the burden of proof so it reinforces
their substantive decision. Having substantively recognized child care
as good cause to refuse work, the courts should create a presumption
in favor of claimants that child care is a valid reason for refusal.
If the courts want to maintain some kind of control on the mat-
ter, they can do what the Shufelt court attempted to do by imputing a
"reasonableness" standard in the presumption. This would free most
working parents who claim unemployment compensation from hav-
ing to establish good cause so long as their actions were reasonable.
The existence of a reasonableness provision, some may claim, still
involves a value judgment on the part of the courts. 26' Though this is
true, the way to change is through a slow process of rethinking bur-
dens and restructuring doctrine. Perhaps the compromise of a rea-
sonableness standard may not be as threatening to some courts
throughout the country which have traditionally been hostile to this
issue. Notwithstanding the burden of proof issue, the California
court's decision in Sanchez is an excellent example of sound doctrinal
analysis in its incorporation of both precedent and ideology resulting
in a gender-neutral recognition of child care as good cause for refus-
ing suitable work.
Sanchez set the stage for further expansion of the good cause pro-
vision. Two years later, in Glick v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals
Board,262 the California Supreme Court held that a student who
restricted her working hours to nights and weekends to attend law
school had good cause for refusing suitable employment under the
statute.26 a The court stated that "given the indispensable role which
education plays in the modern industrial state" the good cause provi-
sion should be read to encompass such reasons for refusing suitable
work.216 The court also pointed out that by attaining a law degree,
the claimant would avoid future possibilities of being unemployed
through no fault of her own, which was the purpose of the statute in
the first place and thus should not be used to deny her benefits.265
The court's extension of good cause to include education followed
260. Shufelt v. Department of Employment & Training, 531 A.2d 894, 896 (Vt. 1987).
261. To minimize disparate determinations of reasonableness, the legislatures or the courts
should articulate guidelines as to the definition of reasonableness. This would facilitate
consistency in the initial eligibility determinations.
262. 591 P.2d 24 (Cal. 1979).
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from Sanchez, which defined good cause as adequate cause. Educa-
tion was certainly an adequate reason to limit the claimant's availabil-
ity.266 The California court, as evident in decisions like Sanchez and
Glick, has interpreted the good cause provisions of the unemployment
compensation statutes liberally thereby affording higher protection
and broader benefits to working mothers.
5. ALASKA
Alaska has followed California's lead. The Supreme Court of
Alaska, in Arndt v. State Department of Labor,267 followed the reason-
ing in Sanchez in holding that a claimant's parental responsibilities
may be considered in a determination of good cause for refusing suita-
ble employment.2 6 The court adopted the claimant's argument that
in determining what constituted good cause and suitable work it
should consider factors that would tend to "influence a reasonably
prudent person" in her decision whether to accept a job.26 9 Institut-
ing the two-part Sanchez test,27° the court remanded the case for a
determination of whether the claimant's decision to refuse work was
reasonable in light of her parental responsibilities.271
There is a problem with cases like this that remand to lower
courts. The remand in Arndt was called for because the determina-
tion of reasonableness is a question of fact for the lower court to
assess. Yet, because the lower courts are faced with situations which
vary factually from claimant to claimant, the result is an indetermi-
nate doctrine. Without the higher courts announcing exact criteria,
based on their interpretation of unemployment compensation statutes,
for when refusal of work due to child care is reasonable and therefore
permissible good cause, the lower courts have little guidance. This is
arguably the reason why the majority of decisions that grant benefits
to workers for child-care reasons seem to be reversals of lower court
decisions. If child-care responsibilities were presumptively treated as
good cause under the statutes, both in the voluntary quit provision
and in the suitability provision, the problem of indetermination would
not exist. This is not necessarily a radical proposition; in most cases
266. Id. at 28. Presumably, if education is viewed as adequate cause under the statutes,
child care should likewise be considered adequate cause for voluntarily leaving a job or
refusing suitable work.
267. Arndt v. State Dep't of Labor, 583 P.2d 799 (Alaska 1978).
268. Id. at 803.
269. Id. at 802.
270. Sanchez, 569 P.2d at 744.




the parents have no alternative but to stay home with their children.
Therefore, in a majority of these cases, a parent's decision to refuse or
quit work is almost automatically reasonable and should result in
unemployment benefits.2 72 A presumption in favor of laws recogniz-
ing child care as good cause would make the job of the lower courts
easier and eliminate many appeals. Also, it would lead to more con-
sistent doctrine.
Some of the inconsistency in the doctrine at the lower court level
may also be due to gendered images.27 a Only now are the courts
slowly becoming aware of the changes in the workplace due to higher
court decisions which address these labor issues. Thus, appellate
court decisions like those in California and Alaska, though encourag-
ing, are not enough unless the lower courts begin to recognize child
care as good cause by rote and decide cases consistently.
6. MASSACHUSETTS
Two Massachusetts cases have developed progressive doctrine
and pose interesting policy questions. The first case, Conlon v. Direc-
tor of Division of Employment Security,27 4 forges new ground in the
determination of good cause under state unemployment statutes in
considering the eligibility of an unemployed nurses' aide.275 The
claimant in Conlon had six children. Because her husband, a fireman,
worked nights, she had the responsibility of caring for the children at
night. The claimant worked for a nursing home until April 1979
when it terminated operations. She applied for and received unem-
ployment compensation benefits, but her benefits were terminated
when Conlon indicated that she was available for work only on the
7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. shift due to her child-care responsibilities. 6
The court linked the two good cause provisions of the eligibility stat-
ute to develop, through deductive logic, a sound argument why child
care should be good cause under the statute.277 The court examined
the legislative history of the statute and found that from 1958 to 1969,
the statute denied benefits to one who left work "voluntarily without
good cause." There was no attachment to the employer required.
272. Sanchez, 569 P.2d at 750.
273. Finley, supra note 193 (explaining that males have created most of our law and as a
result, there is a male slant to much of our legal reasoning, which causes gendered images to
dominate the courts' doctrine.) See also Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Cmi. L.
REV. 1, 64 (1988).
274. Conlon v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec., 413 N.E.2d 727 (Mass. 1980).
275. Id. at 730.
276. Id. at 728.
277. Id. at 730; see also supra note 145.
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However, the legislature amended the clause in 1969 to read "has left
work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employing
unit."2 7 The court concluded from this language change that where
the legislature had wanted to limit good cause solely to that caused by
the employer, it had done so explicitly.27 9 Thus, the court reasoned,
because the legislature did not expressly limit the good cause provi-
sion of the suitability requirement, it intended no such limitation.
Thus, good cause in that context could encompass personal reasons.
The court, simply by incorporating the idea of good cause in the stat-
ute into one inquiry, recognized an exception for personal reasons.28 °
The court then went on to adopt the two-step test of Sanchez and
remanded the case with instructions to follow the new standard set by
the court.281
A second noteworthy Massachusetts case, Raytheon v. Director
of Division of Employment Security,282 established that a claimant's
departure from work for personal reasons could be so compelling as
to render her departure involuntary according to state unemployment
statutes.283 By approaching the issue as a question of law, the court
provided precedent for an unemployment eligibility determination
encompassing child-care responsibilities. The claimant in Raytheon
was a factory worker who worked on the night shift. When her co-
worker, who provided her with transportation, was fired, the claimant
could not get to work. After her emplyoyer denied her request to
change to the day shift, she quit her job.284 In response to her attempt
to collect unemployment benefits, the court stated,
[The general purpose of the unemployment compensation law] is
to afford benefits to persons who are out of work and unable to
secure work through no fault of their own .... The broader pur-
pose of the law is to provide temporary relief for those who are
realistically compelled to leave work through no fault of their own,
whatever the source of the compulsion, personal or employer-
initiated.285
Concluding that the claimant had exhausted all the possibilities avail-
able to her to gain transportation to work, the court held that her
reasons were sufficiently compelling to render her quitting involun-
278. Conlon, 410 N.E.2d at 730.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 729-31.
282. 307 N.E.2d 330 (Mass. 1974).
283. Id. at 332.
284. Id. at 331.
285. Id. at 332 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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tary. Thus, she was eligible for benefits.286
Why was such a liberation in the doctrine of good cause initially
enumerated in a transportation case? And if transportation is a com-
pelling enough reason to receive benefits, should not child care be
similarly classified? What society would honor the former and not the
latter?
IV. GENDERED DOCTRINE
Gender bias explains much of unemployment compensation law.
Although unarticulated, it is a powerful motivator in courts, legisla-
tures, and society. Gender bias is an important area to explore
because it is an example of how male dominance and perspectives
define Anglo-American jurisprudence.
Lucinda Finley, in her article on the gendered nature of legal
language, explains that throughout history the primary creators of the
law have been male. 287 Men have defined the law, interpreted it, and
given it meaning according to their own experience. Not surprisingly,
the law that has emerged reflects a male image. Finley points out that
because men have been the ones to hold power, their legal creations
have gone virtually unchecked; thus their pronouncements of the law
have been seen as natural, complete, and objective. Yet males have
created a law that is gendered and patriarchal. It remains so today as
evidenced by court decisions in various legal arenas. The law of
unemployment compensation is no exception.
Many of the cases examined in this Comment discourage a socie-
tal solution to the problems of child care and restrictive unemploy-
ment compensation eligibility requirements, encouraging instead
personal or market solutions, despite their burdensome effects. The
courts deciding these cases generally refuse to modify the existing
doctrine and have not used the law to produce social change. This is
partly because the capitalist philosophy of American society, in most
instances, leaves one to find private solutions to one's own problems.
Therefore, when a lack of child-care facilities or prohibitive costs
force a parent to leave work to attend to children, it is not unusual for
the courts not to interfere. The gender bias that underlies this percep-
tion often determines the outcomes of particular cases and, in the
aggregate, creates a body of law whose doctrine serves only to rein-
force the problems in the market, rather than offering potential
solutions.288
286. Id. at 333.
287. Finley, supra note 193, at 892-95.
288. Id. This assumes that the law is a powerful instrument of social change. The law
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Unemployment compensation cases illustrate the historically
gendered nature of law. 289 For years, courts dominated by a male
perspective have decided cases which address fundamental problems
in the labor market affecting both males and females. In other areas
of the law, gender discrimination may be less noticeable, but the prob-
lem remains acute for working women. 290 This wholly male perspec-
tive is ill-equipped to render effective decisions in the area of
unemployment compensation. Far too often males interpret issues
that affect women, using male-created precedent. The question is one
of neutrality: can doctrines created in these cases be truly neutral, or
do the male lenses through which the facts are viewed distort the doc-
trine and cause it to be gender biased? As with other areas of law, a
male-oriented perspective and the historical privilege given to the
male viewpoint dramatically affects the resulting doctrine.291
propels our behavior into various directions; the law's influence on employers is no exception.
Therefore, gender bias in the law translates into gender bias in the market as society takes its
cue from the letter of the law. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 35, 79 (1982)
(discussing how male bias is reflected in our capitalist society).
289. As Lucinda Finley notes, males have crafted the majority of our laws, and the effect
has been that these laws favor men. Finley, supra note 193, at 892. Frances Olsen attributes
this male slant to the basic structure of our law, coupled with courts' interpretions of this
structure over time. Our legal system adopted an adversarial model to resolve disputes, first in
private spheres, then in public spheres as society became more complex. Despite the onslaught
of polycentric disputes, the adversarial philosophy which drives and polarizes the legal system
has not changed. A polarized legal system forces dualisms into the definition of law: rational/
irrational, thought/feeling, objective/subjective, abstract/contextualized. These dualisms,
according to Olsen, are sexualized, with the first term in the pair representing the male and the
second term representing the female. Interestingly, the terms and concepts that are basic to
our law appear in the first term. For instance, legal doctrine extols the rational, the objective,
and the abstract. By contrast, legal doctrine rejects the second terms in these dualisms.
Women's voices-perceived to be irrational and subjective-are not heard or reflected in our
laws. However, because more and more women's voices (not characterized as irrational and
subjective, are being heard and reflected in society, especially since women have joined the
workforce, there is an uneasy juxtaposition between current legal doctrine and society. See
Olsen, supra note 252.
290. See, e.g., Beard v. State Dep't of Commerce, Div. of Employment Sec., 369 So. 2d 382
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Yordamlis v. Florida Indus. Comm., 158 So. 2d 791 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1963); Aladdin Indus. Inc. v. Scott, 407 S.W.2d 161 (Tenn. 1966); Nurmi v. Vermont
Employment Sec. Bd., 197 A.2d 483 (Vt. 1964), overruled by Shufelt v. Department of
Employment & Training, 531 A.2d 894 (Vt. 1987). All of these cases, save Yordamlis, deal
with female parents.
291. See, e.g., Finley, supra note 193, at 893 (citing examples of how a male perspective has
affected tort law). If an analogy can be drawn from the treatment of terminology and
comparisons in the general law with unemployment compensation, (concerning the influence
that male legal discourse has on current doctrine), then it is likely that the unemployment
doctrine is affected by gender bias. For example, the term rape has traditionally been taken to
connote a sexual incident between two strangers, and much of the case law focuses on the
question of the woman's consent. This view ignores the glaring reality that rape often occurs
between people who know each other, and it is a violent crime from a woman's viewpoint-
rather than a sexual crime. The legal meaning attached to the term rape is a clear example of a
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Legal comparisons reveal a great deal about the gendered nature
of the law.292 In order to make a comparison, one must discover and
use a norm; in the law, inevitably, that norm is male. Consider the
concept of equality. Just as legal discussions of racism assume a white
norm when making comparisons in determining equality,293 so, too,
the law assumes a male norm when discussing equal opportunity. For
example, in the early days of the feminist movement, women
attempted to attain equality with men with respect to job opportuni-
ties. Males and "male jobs" represented the norm to which courts
and legislatures compared all jobs. This male reference point was part
of the problem with the Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA").29 4
Women were so busy trying to be like men that many failed to realize
the more fundamental problem that the entire male norm was simply
wrong and had to be changed. That, of course, is a harder task than
being equal to men, because it involves a conceptual shift in societal
thought. Given the difficulty of such a conceptual shift, women in the
1970s and 1980s continued to work from the male reference point in
attempting to better their relative positions.295
The ERA movement, hailed in many circles as a revolution for
women's rights, undeniably accomplished some gains for women.
Ironically, however, women were so insistent upon gaining themselves
jobs long occupied only by men that they did so in an almost asexual
fashion. Their goal was to compete in the market for jobs and sala-
ries. The goals of men became the goals of women. The movement
resulted in a rapid increase in the number of women in the work
force, 29 6 but this increase occurred with almost complete disregard for
related issues of importance to women, primarily pregnancy and child
care. Unfortunately, the new rights afforded women to enter the
work force often ignored the rights of their children.297
meaning formulated without female input. Incorporating a female perspective into the law
would entail seeking new definitions for these terms based on alternative experiences. Id. at
895.
292. Id. at 892-95.
293. Many legal comparisons assume certain unarticulated norms. For example, decisions
such as Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), invoking the doctrine of separate but equal
presume the white norm as the standard of equality. Similarly, the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29
U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988) presumes the male norm.
294. H.R.J. Res. No. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
295. See generally Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989)
(analyzing the intersection of the sameness/difference debate in the study of men and women).
296. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Unpublished Data, supra note 1 (comparing statistics on
working women from 1970 to 1990).
297. This Comment does not mean to fault women in any way for having taken this path.
Given the invidious nature of the male gender bias, women in the early days of the feminist
movement had no choice but to compete against a male norm. However, with the benefit of
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Working women began to realize that they were respected only
on the basis of what they had in common with men, rather than for
who they were and what they had to offer. 298 This phenomenon is a
perfect example of gender bias in a market governed by a male norm.
All traces of difference were ignored as the two sexes battled for posi-
tions at the top. Biological differences like pregnancy were denied,
and as a result, maternity or parental policies were given low, if any,
priority. In the mid-1980s, however, there was a re-emergence of
family as an important concern and a realization that families were
suffering from both parents working, because there was less time for
the concerns of children.299 Many women decided that denying their
differences no longer achieved a desired result because the-"desired"
result derived from a male norm. Women began to desire recognition
of their differences, a "celebration of differences." 3" Along with this
decision undoubtedly came the sense that the male norm no longer fit
a society with a workforce comprised of so many women.
Nowhere is the need for a gender paradigm shift as clear as in the
area of unemployment compensation law. In matters of child care,
the male reference point has no historical experience. That is, when
courts rely on images of traditional families in constructing their doc-
trine, no conflict between work and home arises. An understanding
of the conflict of work and family is alien to the male norm.30 It is
thus impossible to fashion effective solutions to the conflict; those
deciding the law are handicapped by an inability to understand the
problem. Consequently, solutions to the unemployment compensa-
tion dilemmas have been incomplete, lacking a female point of
view.302 The emerging unemployment doctrine also lacks a contex-
tual basis. It lacks, as Carol Gilligan and other relational feminists
contend,30 3 an awareness of female "connectedness" which may drive
hindsight and after a generation of children who witnessed the struggle of women to fight for
equality in the workplace, people discovered that both parents working did in fact have some
negative effects on children. These effects have become increasingly worse as the child-care
crisis in America has grown.
298. See Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKLEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 199-204 (1990).
299. See, e.g., ARLIE HOCHSCHILD & ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING
PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989).
300. West, supra note 273, at 18.
301. Finley, supra note 193, at 898.
302. There is no one female point of view or voice; however, some of the language in this
Comment tends to "essentialize" to make a point. That is, learning from Carol Gilligan and
Francis Olsen about the contrasts between males and females, often "a female viewpoint" is
adopted here to highlight certain perspectives in contrast to those of men.
303. See generally GILLIGAN, supra note 288 (offering alternatives to the male norm and
critiquing the individualistic male as lacking a female voice).
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some females to want to care for children, to consider community
needs, and to accommodate emotive and less self-interested needs into
law. 30
If an infusion of feminist theory will cause the courts to face the
problems posed by restrictive eligibility requirements, why not adopt
these concepts and effectuate change? The challenge is that this
would require a complete overhaul of unemployment compensation
doctrine and the system which underlies it. This is so because the
"new model"3 °5 envisioned would use the woman as the reference
point, thereby facilitating recognition of work and family conflicts.
Such a model would be more likely to remove the gender bias from
the unemployment compensation system and would offer potential
societal solutions. A criticism of this shift is that a female norm is no
better than a male norm and may result in equally pervasive gender
bias. However, given the ubiquitous male norm, a female norm is
unlikely to completely surpass it. The goal, of course, is a neutral
norm which represents both male and female perspectives, and a legal
doctrine which reflects cares and concerns of families while account-
ing for the underlying perspectives of both male and female
lawmakers. That goal may be idealistic, but change must begin some-
where. Introducing a female norm may eventually result in a doctrine
made up of both value systems.31 6
Another example of gender bias in unemployment compensation
cases is found in the imagery used in the opinions. As Karl Klare
wrote, "powerful although customarily unarticulated images of the
workplace guide the development of labor law," which is "founded on
the assumption that employee status and self-determination in work
are incompatible. ' 30 7 Such an assumption is not easily uprooted, and
the imagery it creates is dramatic. One such image is Justice Brad-
ley's portrayal of the timid, fragile woman unfit for work outside the
304. West, supra note 273, at 18-22 (discussing Carol Gilligan's theories). The analysis here
assumes that the Olsen dualisms are correct and that the right side does represent females.
However, this itself is a debatable point. It is not the intention of this Comment to accept the
characterization within these dualisms and to thereby reinforce the status quo of legal
doctrine. Rather, the characterizations are simply illustrative of the need for a conceptual
change in the guiding assumptions of the law by a greater acceptance of a female viewpoint.
305. ELIZABETH WOLGAST, EQUALITY AND THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN 22-23 (1980).
306. Finley, supra note 193, at 906-10. The ultimate goal is a doctrine which reflects both
male and female value systems. However, the doctrine in the courts has been male oriented so
long that it will take a rush of female perspectives to counter this bias. This Comment may
seem in the short term to advocate a completely female doctrine, but the limitations of any
such doctrine are apparent. Rather, the goal is a "meeting of the minds," so to speak, in legal
doctrine.
307. Karl Klare, The Bitter and The Sweet: Reflections on the Supreme Court's Yeshiva
Decision, 13 SOCIALIST REV. 99, 103-04, 111-16 (1983).
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home.3"' Later these images evolved into those of the homemaker
who cared for her husband and children and who entered the
workforce only if necessary. Neither of those two images accurately
portray today's women. Yet these images of past generations of
women still govern current legal doctrine.30 9
Stare decisis may explain, in part, why there is not a rush to
correct the burdensome decisions of the unemployment compensation
caselaw. However, these cases send a gender-biased message to and
about women that certainly does not "celebrate female differences.
31
The majority of these decisions, denying unemployment benefits to
mothers who either leave or who are unavailable for work due to
child-care responsibilities, implicitly precludes women from any real
choice between motherhood and their jobs or careers. Courts seem to
ignore the raw conflict between holding down a steady job and being
available to care for children when day care centers are unaffordable
or closed, or the child is ill. 31 1 Many courts still implicitly believe that
a women's lot is to make the home her first priority. 312 Nowhere is
the sacrifice of working women reflected in the tone of court deci-
sions.31 3 There is little acknowledgement in the doctrine that women
are just as eager for and capable of holding jobs and advancing in
careers as men. 314 There is little, if any empathy in the legal language
or exploration into claimants' individual circumstances. Rather,
judges articulate the doctrine by rote, imposing outdated imagery of
women to conclude that child care does not constitute good cause for
leaving work or refusing work. This doctrine, empty of context, is
biased by male values and assumptions about women. Often the
result is a decision that harms female claimants and their children,
simultaneously and invidiously reinforcing the status quo.3,5
Unemployment compensation case law also furthers the eco-
308. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
309. Finley, supra note 193, at 890-93 (discussing the male perspective represented in our
legal language and reasoning, and the lack of competing female perspectives).
310. West, supra note 273, at 18.
311. Sanchez v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 569 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1977) is arguably the
only case in unemployment compensation law which truly recognizes the dilemma between
child care and employment.
312. See, e.g., Beard v. State Dep't of Commerce, Div. of Employment Sec., 369 So. 2d 382
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Aladdin Indus. Inc. v. Scott, 407 S.W.2d 161 (Tenn. 1966).
313. Id.
314. But see Sanchez, 569 P.2d at 740 (noting the conflict between the dual responsibilities
working women face).
315. Intercepting imagery that reinforces the status quo creates a chicken and egg problem;
if we do not change the law, society will not change its perceptions; however, without a societal
sanction of certain reconstructed images, there will be no meaningful change in the law.
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nomic marginalization of women.316 The cases reinforce the imagery
of the traditional, financially stable family. Yet the statistics show
that this imagery no longer accurately reflects American society.317
Many claimants are single mothers who must work to support their
families.318 One of the reasons for focusing on unemployment com-
pensation cases involving low-income workers is to show that, in
order for our unemployment compensation system to be effective,
courts must realize that many women have no real choice-if she is
single and has a child, she must work to support that child. However,
if the child should become ill, she has a parental obligation to care for
the child. More often than not, a mother will not have a facility avail-
able to care for her sick child.319 Thus, her only "choice" is to stay
home and leave or lose her job. If the woman claims unemployment
compensation, under current doctrine in a majority of states, she will
be denied benefits because she left work for personal reasons not
attributable to the employer.3 20  Nowhere in the doctrine are the
financial consequences to that claimant accounted for or even men-
tioned. In a capitalist society, private solutions are the norm, but
what happens when there is no private solution, or the cost of private
solutions is prohibitive? Courts must begin to consider these vexing
questions.
Arguably, the false imagery of a traditional, dual-parent family
which the courts often use as an analytic baseline is the direct cause of
decisions that deny benefits to claimants. Thus, whether it be in the
form of false images of women or false images of the financial stability
of working families, gender bias filters into these decisions and causes
discriminatory outcomes.
The new doctrine must be free from all gender-biased imagery. 2'
It must give workers the right of self-determination without the
316. Williams, supra note 47, at 819.
317. See supra notes 1, 2, 161.
318. See, e.g., Sanchez, 569 P.2d at 740.
319. The majority of the women whom this problem will affect are those in the low-income
bracket. The primary source of child care for these women is subsidized facilities. Yet 1990
statistics from the National Governors' Association show a lack of available slots for low-
income children of these women in 44 of the states. See NATIONAL GOVERNORS'
ASSOCIATION, supra note 39, at 14.
320. Beard v. State Dep't of Commerce, Div. of Employment Sec., 369 So. 2d 382 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Aladdin Indus. Inc. v. Scott, 407 S.W.2d 161 (Tenn. 1966); Hunt v.
Department of Employment Sec., 453 A.2d 391 (Vt. 1982).
321. This does not mean to suggest that what is needed is a degendered doctrine. Rather, a
doctrine reflecting both value systems is desireable. See Williams, supra note 295 (analyzing
ways to deconstruct gender and thereby referencing degendered doctrine); Isabel Marcus,
Reflections on the Significance of the Sex/Gender System: Divorce Law Reform in New York,
42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 55, 72 (1987) (discussing degendered approaches to law reform).
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attendant punishment of the denial of benefits. If this doctrine were
accepted, actions such as changing shifts or leaving work because of
child care would not cause a woman to be denied benefits. This new
doctrine also would require a restructuring of the present unemploy-
ment eligibility requirements to encompass family responsibilities as
good cause both for leaving work and for being unavailable for work.
Granting benefits to working mothers would signal the welcoming of
a female voice into the law.
This alternate model would encompass a new order of equality, a
model which encompasses differences between men and women rather
than bestowing equality upon only those women who deny their dif-
ferences. This model of equality would likely protect a larger percent-
age of women in the labor force, because it would accommodate
working mothers in many different fields. The importance of develop-
ing a new legal model is that law reflects and constructs cultural prac-
tices. Therefore, if the law relies on misplaced assumptions, it will
reinforce those assumptions in our daily lives, which we conduct in
the shadow of the law.
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND SOLUTIONS
Much of the doctrine of unemployment compensation is founded
upon what the family should look like.322 This is in part because of a
holdover notion of what the family used to be. Unemployment com-
pensation law fails to recognize the drastic changes in the family
which have taken place over the last few decades. Today, 81.3% of
divorced female heads of households with children and 55.2% of
never-married female heads of households with children are also in
the labor force.323 No longer should courts assume that when a
mother leaves work to care for her children there is a husband present
to support her. This fundamental change in the dynamics of family
makes the availability of unemployment compensation benefits to
women critical.
The data, which reveals alarming statistics about the number of
women in the workforce with children and the general lack of child-
care facilities in the United States amounts to the same level of seri-
ousness that the empirical data in Brown v. Board of Education did.324
322. See generally Dowd, supra note 3, at 436 (explaining the restructuring of the
workplace as women enter it); Teitelbaum, supra note 17 (describing the development of the
traditional family).
323. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Unpublished Data, supra note 1.
324. Brown v. Board of Education, 348 U.S. 886 (1954); Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Unpublished Data, supra note 1.
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If the courts chose to look at the statistics and the operation of the
market today, they would see that the law needs significant changes.
A larger question is whether society as a whole, through the
vehicle of law, should be concerned with this paradox between work
and home. To acknowledge that society should respond to this con-
cern challenges capitalistic notions of private ordering and implicates
expending public funds for ostensibly private problems. Especially in
light of the present inadequate number of child-care options available
to working families, courts must take these policy considerations seri-
ously in the search for solutions to the problems associated with our
current unemployment compensation law.
Other unemployment compensation systems throughout the
world provide possible legislative models. Canada funds its system of
unemployment compensation from three sources: the employee con-
tributes 2.2% of her earnings, the employer contributes 3.15% of its
payroll, and the government covers the extra cost of benefits when the
regional rate of unemployment is above 4%.325 This tripartite
approach feeds great amounts of money into the system, thereby pro-
viding more benefits to a greater number of claimants. This is in con-
trast to the United States system, in which the only source of funding
is an employer tax.326 If legislatures allocated more money to the
United States system, courts might be more willing to interpret eligi-
bility requirements more liberally and the statutes themselves might
be changed to encompass a wider base of applicants.
The unemployment system in Japan, like the Canadian system, is
tripartite, with an employee, employer, and government contribution,
but the Japanese government absorbs 25% of the normal cost of the
system and 33.33% in times of deficit. 327 This large government con-
tribution stabilizes the system by injecting money to provide a large
benefit base. Another interesting characteristic of the Japanese sys-
tem is that their extended benefit plan includes maternity leave.328
The Swedish system is intriguing in that it is a voluntarily subsi-
dized system. 29 It is operated by unemployment compensation funds
collected by trade unions, which receive substantial subsidies from the
government. The system operates with a union-related program to
which employees contribute, employers contribute 2.16% of the pay-
roll, and the government contributes 46% of the cost of the program.
325. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 55 (1989).
326. Id. at 272.
327. Id. at 136.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 246.
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The Swedish system also includes a labor market support program
with no employee contribution, a 2.16% employer contribution and a
33.33% government contribution. Claimants receive benefits from
both programs according to their fund and wage class.330
Finally, the German unemployment system is unique in its
administration. It is a compulsory insurance system funded by both
employee and employer contributions and a government financed,
need-based supplement. The government funds this supplement
entirely from general revenues. The United States unemployment sys-
tem has no equivalent need-based program.33' The German system,
like the others mentioned above, allows for two sources of funding,
which in turn increases the financial base of the system and offers
benefits to a potentially larger applicant pool than is offered in the
United States.
Achieving greater funding for the unemployment compensation
system may prompt judicial awareness or legislative action on individ-
ual eligibility requirements. Of course, none of these foreign pro-
grams solve our system's problems completely because the economies
of the countries mentioned are different from our own. Such pro-
grams may work in those economies, but not in the United States free
market economy. However, the more we know of alternate systems,
the greater the possibility of combining some of their features to
arrive at a more comprehensive system of our own. Also, although
these systems have more funding sources, including employee contri-
bution, the tax rate is higher in those countries than in the United
States. Generally, the consensus in the United States is against pro-
grams that encourage a higher tax rate. Yet, competing policies sug-
gest a need to consider not only the financial variables to the equation
but also the human variables. It is time to recognize that this conflict
deserves not only a private solution, but a public one as well. 33
2
Child-care alternatives may also help resolve the problems with
the unemployment compensation system. According to Dr. Betty
Caldwell at the University of Arkansas,
[Y]ou can't just add the idea that the world is round to the idea
that it is flat. You have to go back and rethink the whole enter-
prise. This is what society has to do with child care-rethink the
330. Id.
331. Id. at 94.
332. It is important to differentiate between a full coverage unemployment compensation
system and a less intrusive coverage system, only providing coverage for working parents.
With the public generally skeptical of welfare programs, perhaps limiting coverage, and
working within the existing coverage structures is more practical, so long as, at a minimum,
child care is included as good cause under the statutes.
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whole enterprise and come up with a new understanding of it. 33
One approach to helping society rethink this issue is for the courts to
be aware of the problems that exist and for them to reflect an under-
standing of those problems in their doctrine. The market, with an
impetus from employers, can offer help to working parents. Some of
the options open to employers include: promoting employer-assisted
child-care programs on- or off-site, supporting resource and referral
agencies for parents with children, providing flex-time options to
Workers, instituting broad maternity leave and parental policies, or
even implementing six-hour work days in certain industries.334 Pro-
ponents of the law and economics theory might argue that such meas-
ures will cut production, slow the flow of capital, and compromise
employer prerogatives.335 In a capitalist society such criticism may
impede efforts to implement changes. 3 6 Once again, however, the
damage done by employers ignoring these issues is substantial in
terms of its effect on working women and their children. Although
the effects of this damage may not become apparent to employers in
the short term, if the present system continues without reform, the
long-term damage to employers will become apparent as employees
will repeatedly interrupt their jobs or leave them permanently for
family responsibilities and consequently, productivity will decrease.
Economic solutions and creative child-care programs are of
course necessary, but, perhaps first, we must change our legal doc-
trine by interpreting unemployment compensation eligibility require-
ments liberally. Eligibility requirements which in application
discriminate against working women pose questions about the
gendered nature of our law. The failure of the majority of jurisdic-
tions to make any headway into the "feminization" of our laws com-
pounds the problem.
What is the best solution? Perhaps a determination of good
333. NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASS'N, supra note 39.
334. Id. at 20; Williams, supra note 47, at 835. If employers do not implement changes to
accommodate working parents, employees may continue to attempt private solutions to allow
them to work and support their families. Two considerations urge employer involvement
despite the cost. First, the number of women in the workforce is increasing, and the problem
of child care will not go away. Employers, to remain productive, can no longer afford to
ignore these issues. Second, normative values must guide employers to the recognition that
parents, especially mothers, should not have to carry the burden of this uneasy juxtaposition of
work and home privately. With the high incidence of familial breakdown and the adverse
effect on children, employers should consider more than a short-term cost analysis in their
choices to fund employee child-care programs.
335. Simons, Some Reflections on Syndicalism, in BERNARD D. MELTZER & STANLY D.
HENDERSON: LABOR LAW CASES MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS, 39-48 (3d. ed. 1985).
336. See generally, ATLESON, supra note 172 (discussing labor law's resistance to change
due to assumptions about managerial authority which should no longer be paramount).
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cause should depend on the ages of the children at home-parents of
young children receiving more benefits than parents of teenagers.
However, there may be moral problems associated with courts decid-
ing who needs more care and attention. Perhaps it should depend on
the working hours required. But if so, we must be careful not to fall
back into relegating women to only daytime jobs and thus denying
them equal status with their male counterparts. None of these sugges-
tions points to an adequate solution to the problem. Perhaps a combi-
nation of alternatives motivated by an awareness of the problem will
lend itself to the creation of a more fair and efficient system.
Ignoring these unemployment and child-care issues will not take
the problem away. Women are not going to be forced back to the
home.33 7 Misplaced assumptions about gender and choice created
images about women and labor many years ago that persist today in
spite of statistical realities.338 We must recognize the roots of those
assumptions in order to rid our courts of them so that a genuinely
new doctrine can emerge with completely new and different founda-
tions. The system must be reformed through a new body of law more
like that of California and Alaska. We must, as a society, explicitly
recognize the importance of protecting family and take steps to do so
by initiating new eligibility requirements granting benefits to women
who leave work or refuse work for reasons associated with child care.
VI. CONCLUSION
Child care and family responsibilities should be paramount con-
cerns in our complex society which virtually requires both parents to
work. Until limitations are removed from the eligibility requirement
provisions of unemployment compensation statutes, we truly cannot
make inroads into bridging the gap, both legally and socially, between
family and work. Thus, a crucial starting point for our courts and
legislators should be a focus on child-care responsibilities being recog-
337. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 36.
338. We must change the assumptions as we must change the law. The market will not
change on its own, it has not up to this point. In order to change, we must exit ourselves, look
from outside and recreate. In his book, Atleson expresses his disappointment with the fact
that much of labor law in this country today is still founded upon antiquated common law
notions which thus nullifies much of the revolutionary advances made in the law by the
NLRA. See generally ATLESON, supra note 172. In much the same way, false assumptions
prefigure our unemployment compensation law today. One wonders what Atleson expected,
given the deep rooting of the common law tradition in this country.
Presumably, the same could be said of the disappointment expressed in this Comment
about courts' narrow interpretation of unemployment compensation statutes. The difference
here, however, is the recognition that old common law assumptions influence current doctrine.
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nized as good cause, irrespective of whether such child care requires
leaving a job or refusing to accept one.
The two good-cause provisions statutes should be linked so that
neither provision requires good cause to be attributable to the
employer. There is no logic in saying that certain reasons that qualify
as good cause to leave a job are not also acceptable reasons for refus-
ing suitable employment. Good cause to refuse suitable work should
be open ended enough to include domestic responsibilities.3 39 Aware-
ness is critical because it makes us rethink and reconstruct our con-
ceptions of the current nature of our laws and our social
institutions . 34 Awareness that women are in fact boxed into discrim-
ination with respect to child care. This is because the market discrim-
inates against working mothers from one side and the law
discriminates against them on the other. The only difference between
the two kinds of discrimination is when they occur. The market dis-
criminates by pressuring the working mother at the first stage of the
process to "choose" either work or family. The law discriminates
against these women in the second stage of the process, when they
become unemployed by leaving work to care for their children.
Far too often women have to choose between jobs or career goals
and family responsibility. Our present legal and societal structures do
not accommodate simultaneous career advancement and motherhood.
Similarly, the law ignores the difficult issues associated with working
women and child care, including the gender bias inherent in the
unemployment compensation system and the financial consequences
of denying benefits to women when they "choose" to leave their jobs
or refuse "suitable" work to care for their children. An awareness of
this connection between the market and the law is essential for
change. Recognizing the link between the two goes a long way to
understanding that law can change the market. As the trends in the
law change, so too do those in the market. Unemployment compensa-
tion is a good starting point from which to create new models. We
need a new legal model with fresh perspectives not encrusted by years
339. The court in In re Watson, 161 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1968), ruled the opposite of the
Vermont court, refusing to impute the limitation "attributable to the employer" onto the good
cause provision for refusing suitable work simply because such a limitation existed in the
previous paragraph of the statute having to do with voluntary quits. The court reasoned that it
was not legislative oversight to include such a limitation in one section of statute and yet leave
it out of another. Rather, it stated that "good cause for rejecting a proposed new employment
need not be connected with the work itself.... The wisdom of such a distinction is for the
legislature, our authority being merely to determine the meaning of the words." Id. at 10.
340. Finley, supra note 193, at 909.
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of male jurisprudence, and a new model of the market which ade-
quately accommodates the female who is both worker and mother.
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